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 Over the last several years, scholars studying health innovation policy 
have carefully considered the ways in which policymakers regulate different 
types of technologies to encourage their development and dissemination. 
Scholars have examined a range of legal incentives, including patents, Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) exclusivity periods, taxes, grants, insurance 
reimbursement, and other tools to promote socially valuable innovations that 
our current system has structurally disfavored. 
However, this research has neglected the temporal dimension of the issue. 
Specifically, a large set of innovations in the life sciences may be considered to 
be intermediate innovations. Scientists continue to improve these technologies 
over time, even as the initial products are made available to patients. Yet the 
relevant innovation policy levers do not consider whether intermediate 
technologies ought to be regulated differently from technologies which are 
further along in the development process. 
Whether our existing regulatory frameworks are cognizant of an 
innovation’s stage of development matters. If the regulatory structure around 
the intermediate technology is not appropriately calibrated, the technology 
could be frozen in time such that future development does not occur. This 
failure would be harmful both for public health and for societal welfare. Policy 
levers that appear targeted at early-stage technologies in fact lack a fit with 
these considerations. 
This Article articulates the problem of regulating intermediate 
technologies in the life sciences and considers how existing laws and 
regulations might be altered to accommodate the situation. It argues that some 
of the FDA’s existing regulatory approaches are capable of addressing the 
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problem, and others can be altered to do so. Other solutions may lie in the 
realm of reimbursement, where the stage of a technology could play into the 
payments made by insurers for that technology. 
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Introduction 
 Today, many of us carry around cell phones that have incredible 
computing and software capabilities. Our phones allow us not only to 
communicate with each other, but also to record and edit video and audio, use 
word- and data-processing programs, and play video games.1 Increasingly, 
these phones are also able to serve as powerful medical devices, allowing 
doctors to carry out electrocardiograms, ultrasounds, blood pressure 
monitoring, and more—all using a device they carry in their pockets.2 
 
1. David Pierce, Your Smartphone Is the Best Computer You Own, WALL ST. J. (May 23, 2018 
10:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/your-phone-is-the-best-computer-you-ownso-use-it-more-
1527084001 [https://perma.cc/VD6H-K2B7]. 
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 One of the reasons cell phone technology has progressed so rapidly over 
the last several years is the ability of software developers to iterate their 
products on short timescales and to push updates to users whenever a new 
version is available. Whether it is Apple or Android pushing their newest 
operating system update, or a new version of one of our apps, consumers have 
become accustomed to accepting these frequent updates. These updates are 
pushed to users at the discretion of companies when they decide it is time to fix 
a bug or add a feature. 
But what about updates to medical software? Updates to the ultrasound 
software for the iPhone—or the software that runs your implanted pacemaker 
or insulin pump? These products are not only consumer goods. They are also 
medical devices, regulated by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). 
Companies may need the agency’s approval before making updates, even (or 
perhaps especially) if those updates are needed to address serious safety 
issues,3 imposing a barrier to improvements. Alternatively, companies may 
lack the incentives to develop such improvements if health insurers will not 
compensate them for those improvements or if there are intellectual property 
concerns. 
This problem—the problem of technologies which are intermediate in 
nature, but which ought to be improved with time—is not limited to the digital 
health context. It extends more broadly throughout the health care technologies 
field and to technologies in other fields as well, such as self-driving cars.4 Yet 
it has been largely ignored in the literature. To be sure, there is a large and 
growing scholarly literature on incentives for innovation in health care 
technologies, a significant portion of which has focused on institutional actors 
including the FDA.5 But this scholarship largely focuses on whether a 
technology is developed in the first instance, not whether an available 
technology is subject to improvements over time. 
This Article takes up this question of the regulation of intermediate 
technologies. It contends that the regulation of intermediate technologies poses 
 
3. See, e.g., Firmware Update to Address Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities Identified in Abbott’s 
(Formerly St. Jude’s Medical) Implantable Cardiac Pacemakers: FDA Safety Communication, FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN. (Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/safety-communications/firmware-
update-address-cybersecurity-vulnerabilities-identified-abbotts-formerly-st-judes-medicals 
[https://perma.cc/53VB-2JHY]. 
4. See, e.g., Tracy Hresko Pearl, Fast & Furious: The Misregulation of Driverless Cars, 73 
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 19, 27-29 (2017) (articulating the industry-specified levels of automation 
and explaining that we are midway through the process and have not yet achieved full automation). 
5. See generally, Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345 (2007); Yaniv Heled, Patents vs. Statutory Exclusivities in Biological 
Pharmaceuticals—Do We Really Need Both?, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 419 (2012); 
Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 303 
(2013); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patentable Subject Matter and Nonpatent Innovation Incentives, 5 
U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1115 (2015); W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Black-Box Medicine, 116 MICH. L. 
REV. 421 (2017); Arti K. Rai, Building a Better Innovation System: Combining Facially Neutral Patent 
Standards with Therapeutics Regulation, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1037 (2008); Rachel E. Sachs, Innovation 
Law and Policy: Preserving the Future of Personalized Medicine, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1881 (2016). 
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special concerns, because a poorly calibrated regulatory structure may freeze a 
technology in time, such that future development does not occur. Importantly, 
these regulations are likely to be both well-intentioned and critical for 
consumer protection in most cases. Yet they may still have this side effect, 
ossifying intermediate health care technologies at an early stage of 
development, which would be harmful both to public health and societal 
welfare. Our existing regulatory frameworks largely do not take account of an 
innovation’s stage of development, and existing laws and regulations will need 
to be altered to accommodate these particular challenges. 
Part I of this Article answers two fundamental questions: what exactly is 
an intermediate technology, and what might we learn from other scholars about 
it? Legal and economic scholars have asked questions about the process of 
research and development that are related to but distinct from this problem, and 
those strands of the literature reveal helpful information in addressing this 
issue. Further, the range of examples of intermediate health care technologies is 
quite broad. Using examples of genetic testing, pharmaceutical manufacturing, 
and the microbiome, Part I demonstrates the diversity of intermediate 
technologies, expanding the potential scope of the problem. Part I closes by 
addressing the question of whether this broad scope is unlimited—in other 
words, whether everything is an intermediate technology, and if so, what that 
would mean for this inquiry. 
Part II examines the ways in which different doctrines within innovation 
policy have dealt with the question of intermediacy or sequential innovation. A 
set of doctrines within patent law is explicitly designed to mediate between the 
interests of first inventors and subsequent improvers, but these doctrines 
typically envision clashes between multiple parties, rather than envisioning an 
initial creator who seeks to improve their own product. Food and drug law has 
more recently considered the problem of intermediacy, but specifically in the 
context of health care software, a development that provides insight into how a 
flexible strategy can allow an agency to leverage old statutes in service of new 
problems.6 Finally, literature in administrative law and environmental law has 
developed a theory of adaptive management, in which agencies are able to alter 
their regulations in the face of new information or changing conditions. 
Part III applies these lessons to consider how existing laws might be 
altered to accommodate the problem of intermediate technologies. It chiefly 
argues that some of the FDA’s existing regulatory approaches around devices 
or biologic products are already capable of addressing the problem (even if 
they were designed for other purposes), and others can be altered to do so. 
Other solutions may lie in the realm of reimbursement, in which the stage of a 
technology could play into the payments made by insurers for that technology, 
either through the use of existing policy levers or through the creation of new 
 
6. See generally Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1 (2014). 
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ones. It is somewhat more pessimistic about patent law’s ability to deal with 
these problems, however. 
Part IV widens the Article’s scope, considering whether the problem of 
intermediacy in health care technologies has implications beyond the health 
care field. It argues that, for technologies embedded within an existing 
regulatory framework (such as self-driving cars), the principles articulated in 
Part III can easily be translated. However, for technologies largely untethered 
from existing regulation (such as many web-based technologies), the 
“intermediate technologies” framing is a poor fit for the true concerns at issue. 
I. Defining the Problem 
 Some examples of intermediate technologies, like the self-driving car 
innovations mentioned above, will be immediately identifiable and broadly 
understandable. Others, like the pharmaceutical technologies described infra in 
Section I.B, require more explanation and may not be apparent upon first 
glance. As such, it is critical to attempt to define more precisely what is meant 
by an “intermediate technology.” Essentially all technologies are intermediate 
in some ways—innovators always strive for improvement over time—but my 
focus here is more specific. 
 It may be easiest to define the concept of “intermediate technologies” 
by reference to the problem this Article seeks to solve. Specifically, it is 
concerned with the set of technologies where, if the existing regulatory 
structure is not appropriately calibrated, the technology will be frozen at an 
early stage of commercialization such that future development does not occur. 
To put it slightly differently, the essential concern is that if the regulation 
around the intermediate technology is not appropriately calibrated, the end-
stage technology will not be developed. 
 In my view, this framing of the concern has two corollaries. First, this 
would be a bad thing. It would be harmful—for public health, for societal 
welfare—if these technologies were not developed further. Although this 
proposition is not highly controversial, it is certainly contestable. It is difficult 
if not impossible to determine whether the level of innovation in any particular 
area is optimal.7 Even the concept of innovation itself is amorphous, although 
here I adhere to the framework I have adopted in previous work: my focus is on 
the promotion of innovation in health technologies “where private market 
signals are not likely to be reflective of social value,”8 here because of the 
existing regulatory barriers. 
 
7. It is highly likely that in some areas of health care technologies there is too much 
investment, and in others there is not enough. 
8. Rachel E. Sachs, Administering Health Innovation, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1991, 1996 
(2018). 
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Second, though, we would not obviously be able to identify such 
occurrences. By definition, the concern is that the existing regulatory 
framework will stifle future innovation along a particular path, so we as a 
society do not observe the innovation that is never developed.9 It is not easy to 
identify the invisible innovation that could have but never took place, even 
where it might have proven socially valuable. 
A version of this argument is commonly made by technology companies 
that are currently not subject to significant governmental regulation (most 
notably internet companies like Facebook or Google) in an attempt to forestall 
the imposition of such regulation, a topic to which I return in Section IV.B. But 
it is also made by companies that are already subject to more significant 
governmental regulation, although that regulation varies by technological area. 
These latter companies and technological areas are the primary focus of this 
Article. 
 In this Part, I consider this formulation of the problem—one concerned 
about technological ossification driven by regulatory structures—and examine 
different aspects of it. First, I situate it within the existing literature on 
innovation and regulation, explaining how it both resembles and differs from 
existing problems already identified. Second, I provide examples of 
intermediate technologies, explaining how their temporal qualities are mediated 
by existing regulation and what scientists hope to accomplish in the future. 
Finally, I consider whether there are any true limiting principles associated 
with this formulation of the problem, and if not, what implications that may 
have for its force and generalizability. 
A. Contextualizing the Temporal Aspects of the Literature 
 The existing literature on innovation policy has grappled with three sets 
of policy concerns that resemble the problem of intermediate technologies in 
some important ways, but differ in others. Considering the similarities and 
differences of these policy concerns not only provides a fuller appreciation of 
the existing literature and its scope but also reveals aspects of those policy 
concerns that remain unexplored by scholars. 
 First, there is a significant and growing strand of scholarship that 
considers how different legal incentives shape the kinds of new technologies 
that are developed. Scholars have considered the roles played by general 
incentives including patents,10 grants,11 tax credits,12 prizes,13 and other legal 
 
9. It is here that international comparisons become relevant. Other countries may adopt 
different balances of innovation incentives, meaning that these technologies could be developed 
elsewhere. 
10. See, e.g., Eric Budish et al., Do Firms Underinvest in Long-Term Research? Evidence 
from Cancer Clinical Trials, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 2044 (2015); Ted M. Sichelman, Commercializing 
Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341 (2010). 
11. See, e.g., W. Nicholson Price II, Grants, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1(2019). 
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tools14 in encouraging the development of new technologies of all kinds, and 
they have also considered the ways in which technology-specific incentives 
like FDA exclusivity periods also serve these goals.15 The goal of much of this 
scholarship is to consider not only how these incentives promote innovation, 
but also what innovations they might be leaving on the table, and how we 
might alter or support existing law to encourage the development of those 
innovations. 
 One article by Professors Amy Kapczynski and Talha Syed16 is 
emblematic of this line of scholarship. They argue that patents “will predictably 
and systematically distort private investment decisions” by “overstating the 
value of highly excludable information goods and understating the value of 
highly nonexcludable ones.”17 In short, private firms will be more likely to 
invest in the development of highly excludable goods like novel 
pharmaceuticals rather than much less excludable information goods with 
similar or even greater social value, such as the development of negative 
information about existing drugs18 or innovations in health care quality such as 
a surgical checklist.19 Kapczynski & Syed use their analysis to bolster existing 
arguments about the importance of public funding of informational goods like 
these, arguing that the output of much of this research will be “highly 
nonexcludable and hence particularly ill-suited to be generated by markets and 
patents,”20 even if it is of high social value. 
 The authors writing in this line of scholarship have focused on the types 
of technologies that are incentivized under existing law, and the types of 
technologies that are left out. Does the fact that patents must be applied for 
early in the drug development process disadvantage pharmaceuticals whose 
development can be expected to be particularly lengthy, such as those that 
prevent disease rather than treat it?21 Should we expect investment in 
diagnostic tests to stagnate after the Supreme Court made it more difficult to 
 
12. See, e.g., Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-Prizes Debate, 
92 TEX. L. REV. 303 (2013). 
13. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115 (2003); 
Benjamin N. Roin, Intellectual Property Versus Prizes: Reframing the Debate, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 999, 
1013 (2014). 
14. See, e.g., Rachel E. Sachs, Prizing Insurance: Prescription Drug Insurance as Innovation 
Incentive, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 153 (2016). 
15. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 5; Heled, supra note 5; Ouellette, supra note 5. 
16. Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, The Continuum of Excludability and the Limits of 
Patents, 122 YALE L.J. 1900 (2013). 
17. Id. at 1942. 
18. Id. at 1923-26; see also id. at 1903 (noting that excludability is not a “binary quality” but 
is instead highly variable along a spectrum). 
19. Id. at 1937. 
20. Id. at 1951. 
21. See, e.g., Budish et al., supra note 10. 
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obtain patents on these technologies,22 or can we expect other innovation 
incentives to fill the gaps?23 Does the fact that private insurance pays more for 
drugs than does Medicaid discourage drug companies from developing drugs 
for low-income populations?24 
Importantly, at its core this is the same question I address in this Article. 
My question is whether existing regulatory structures incentivize the 
development of an intermediate technology but disincentivize the development 
of a more advanced, end-stage version of that technology. Both this Article and 
this line of scholarship are fundamentally looking for invisible technologies, 
whose absence is difficult to detect. But these articles generally consider 
whether a technology is developed at all—not what stage of the technology is 
brought to market, or whether the technology is then prone to improvements 
later on. In short, they do not consider the temporal nature or intermediacy of 
the technology.  
A second strand of literature has focused more heavily on the staged 
development of health care technologies. This literature examines the 
evocatively named “Valley of Death,” which “separates upstream research on 
promising genes, proteins, and biological pathways from downstream drug 
candidates.”25 The concern is that the initial academic research that articulates 
disease pathways and identifies potential drug compounds that might be 
brought to bear on those pathways will not translate to the necessary 
commercial development of a pharmaceutical product, even if the science is 
promising. Making sure that promising health care technologies can traverse 
the “Valley of Death” is critical to ensuring that basic research discoveries 
translate into real health benefits for patients. 
 Scholars like Professors Rebecca Eisenberg and Arti Rai have written 
about the ways in which the “Valley of Death” problem stems from and can be 
addressed through innovation-policy levers. The failure to translate academic 
discoveries into private-sector development efforts was a key driver in the 
passage of the Bayh-Dole Act,26 which permitted universities to retain patent 
 
22. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Diagnostics Need Not Apply, 21 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 
256, 256 (2015) (“[M]ost important advances in [diagnostic testing] lie outside the boundaries of patent-
eligible subject matter.” (footnote omitted)). 
23. See Ouellette, supra note 5, at 1128. 
24. See Sachs, supra note 5, at 200. 
25. Arti K. Rai et al., Pathways Across the Valley of Death: Novel Intellectual Property 
Strategies for Accelerated Drug Discovery, 8 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 1, 4 (2008); see also 
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Tailoring Incentives: A Comment on Hemel and Ouellette’s Beyond the 
Patents-Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 131, 134 (2014) (describing federal research as a potential 
solution to the “valley of death” problem). Although much of this literature has focused on healthcare 
technologies, some of it has been applied more generally. See, e.g., F. Scott Kieff, IP Transactions: On 
the Theory & Practice of Commercializing Innovation, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 727, 744 (2005); Liza 
Vertinsky, Making Knowledge and Making Drugs? Experimenting with University Innovation Capacity, 
62 EMORY L.J. 741, 821 n.10 (2013). 
26. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and 
Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1698-99 (1996); Arti 
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rights in the technologies they developed. In theory, those patents then 
facilitate transactions between universities and private firms looking to develop 
those technologies.27 However, patents alone may be insufficient to ensure that 
translational research occurs, and Rai and others have proposed more intensive 
collaborations between academics and industry as one possible catalyst for 
scientific advancements.28 
 This line of scholarship focuses far more on the temporal nature of 
research and development than does the innovation-policy literature, which 
focuses on the kinds of technologies that are advantaged and disadvantaged by 
the current set of policy levers. The temporal aspect of the research question 
provides a useful analogy for the problem of intermediate technologies. In a 
way, the problem of intermediate technologies articulates a second Valley of 
Death, one that appears only after a technology is initially developed and erects 
barriers to its final state. The question then can be reframed around how to 
traverse that second Valley and promote more complete development of the 
relevant technology. 
 The focus of the Valley of Death literature on the development process, 
rather than on the binary question of whether the technology is developed or 
not developed, is a frame that carries over to the question of intermediate 
technologies. Its focus on not only innovation-policy levers but also on 
institutional relationships among different actors in the innovation ecosystem is 
helpful as well. But there is still a gap between the Valley of Death scholarship 
and the question posed in this Article. The primary concern for scholars writing 
on the Valley of Death is ultimately whether a particular product comes to 
market at all, not whether a product, once it is available, is improved over time. 
But the intermediate technologies question also incorporates questions about 
iterating improvement over time. 
 Third, this question of cumulative or sequential innovation has been 
taken up squarely in the intellectual property scholarship.29 Some of this work 
 
Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 
NW. U. L. REV. 77, 95-96 (1999). 
27. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in 
THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609, 615 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research ed., 
1962); Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 
989, 1050-51 (1997). But see Michael J. Burstein, Exchanging Information Without Intellectual 
Property, 91 TEX. L. REV. 227 (2012) (arguing that patents are not essential to facilitate these types of 
transactions). 
28. Rai et al., supra note 25, at 4-6. Industry has indeed begun forming financial partnerships 
with universities of this type, dedicated to discovering potential new therapies and advancing them 
through the development process. See, e.g., Jonathan D. Rockoff, Big Pharma, Short on Blockbusters, 
Outsources the Science, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 6, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/big-pharma-short-on-
blockbusters-outsources-the-science-1481042583 [https://perma.cc/DY2C-9HLS]; Brigid Sweeney, In 
Era of Research Cuts, Romance Blossoming Much Earlier Between Universities and Big Pharma, 
CRAIN’S CHI. BUS. (June 10, 2017), http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20170610/ISSUE01/
170609858/in-era-of-research-cuts-romance-blossoming-much-earlier-betweenuniversities-and-big-
pharma [https://perma.cc/B5D5-7W3X]. 
29. I discuss some of these doctrinal moves in more detail in Section II.A, infra. 
  
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 37:219, 2020 
228 
 
examines particular doctrines designed to encourage successive innovators to 
improve existing technologies, such as blocking patents.30 But much of it 
considers the scope of intellectual property rights and whether granting broad 
or narrow rights, or granting rights early or late in the development process, 
will most effectively serve the goals of promoting scientific progress.31 The 
essential inquiry is “how patent scope decisions influence the development of a 
technology, both in the sense of an individual invention and that of a future line 
of improvements extending from it.”32 The concern is that granting broad 
patents to initial inventors may discourage follow-on research that leads to 
“something not simply slightly different but significantly better than the 
patented technology.”33 
 One of the foundational articles on this subject, Professors Robert 
Merges and Richard Nelson’s On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope,34 
illustrates the difficulty of this inquiry but also reveals how it has not yet been 
applied fully to the health technologies sphere. Merges and Nelson contrast 
technologies whose development fits the “discrete invention model,” in which 
the invention “does not point the way to wide ranging subsequent technical 
advances” and may be understood largely as an end-stage technology,35 with 
technologies following the cumulative innovation model, “in the sense that 
today’s advances build on and interact with many other features of existing 
technology.”36 They argue that broad, early patents may cause problems for 
innovation in cumulative technologies, while they are less likely to be of 
concern for discrete technologies.37 Merges and Nelson contend that “many 
new pharmaceuticals” fit the discrete invention model,38 but note that the 
processes for manufacturing these drugs may fit the cumulative technology 
model more closely.39 Initially, this would seem to suggest that any problems 
of intermediacy would more strongly affect pharmaceutical manufacturing than 
it would pharmaceutical development as a distinct process. 
 
30. See, e.g., Kevin Emerson Collins, Getting into the “Spirit” of Innovative Things: Looking 
to Complementary and Substitute Properties to Shape Patent Protection for Improvements, 26 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1217, 1271-72 (2011); Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in 
Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 991-92 (1997). 
31. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 
265 (1977); Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the 
Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 33-35 (1991). 
32. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 839, 843 (1990). 
33. Id. at 870. 
34. 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990). 
35. Id. at 880. 
36. Id. at 881. 
37. Id. at 882. 
38. Id. at 880, 882 (“[P]articular chemical product innovations seldom are the keystones to the 
development of large numbers of other chemicals.”). 
39. Id. at 883, 898. 
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However, Merges and Nelson also carve out a third category of 
technologies, in addition to those that are either discrete or cumulative: those 
that are science-based.40 Science-based technologies are those “whose advance 
is predominantly driven by such developments,”41 where granting early broad 
patents has the potential to stifle the development of the field as a whole. 42 
Merges and Nelson place the then-emerging field of biotechnology in this 
category.43 Importantly, as the science in a field becomes more established, 
Merges and Nelson envision that innovation will become either discrete or 
cumulative, such that the “issues involved in setting appropriate patent scope 
changes as an industry advances.”44 Publishing in 1990, the authors did not 
advance a view as to how the field of biotechnology would evolve. Now, when 
seven out of the ten best-selling drugs in the world are biologic products,45 it 
may be time to revisit this question. 
 The intellectual-property literature on cumulative innovation is an easy 
fit with the idea of intermediate technologies, and therefore provides a 
theoretical grounding for the investigation in this Article. However, its 
application to health care technologies has yet to be fully explored. First, health 
care technologies today are different in kind from the technologies that were 
prominent when much of this foundational literature was written. The rise of 
biologic products, in which the product is defined more by its manufacturing 
process than by its chemical formula,46 suggests that pharmaceuticals today 
may share more similarities with the cumulative innovation model than the 
discrete-innovation model, with the resulting implications for patent scope that 
Merges and Nelson articulate. At the same time, the literature’s focus on 
intellectual property has sidelined the role of other regulatory regimes that are 
critical to the development of health care technologies: safety and efficacy 
regulations imposed by the FDA and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS), and regulations regarding insurance reimbursement for these 
technologies. This Article not only updates the patent literature for our current 
understanding of technological intermediacy, but also explores patent law’s 
interaction with FDA regulations and insurance reimbursement in this space. 
 
40. Id. at 880, 883-84. 
41. Id. at 883. 
42. Id. at 883-84. 
43. Id. at 904. 
44. Id. at 908. 
45. Rupali Mukherjee, Biologics Enter Top Selling Drugs’ List, TIMES OF INDIA (Dec. 28, 
2016), https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/Biologics-enter-top-selling-drugs-
list/articleshow/56209425.cms [https://perma.cc/6DZH-UPEW]. 
46. W. Nicholson Price II & Arti K. Rai, Manufacturing Barriers to Biologics Competition 
and Innovation, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1023, 1028 (2016). 
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B. Illustrating the Scope of Intermediate Technologies 
 With this background in mind, the search for intermediate 
technologies—those where the existing regulatory structure threatens to ossify 
the technology at the stage when it is ready for public consumption, but before 
its full potential is reached—begins to yield results. Examples of intermediate 
technologies can be found readily, and three examples from the health care 
field are instructive: diagnostic testing, manufacturing process improvements, 
and tissue platform technologies. 
These three examples helpfully reveal both the different ways in which 
technologies can have intermediate qualities and the different ways in which 
technologies can be rendered “stuck” by the regulatory framework. However, 
they are by no means intended to exhaust the possible set of intermediate 
technologies or even to represent the only three categories of such technologies 
(products, processes, and platform technologies). Instead, they are particularly 
useful because they are all examples in which scientists could or can foresee 
with at least some clarity the future direction of the technology—that is, their 
intermediacy is readily apparent. 
1. Learning from Genetic Testing 
 A core example comes from the world of diagnostic tests. Scholars have 
written a great deal about Myriad Genetics’ tests for mutations in the BRCA 
genes, which can predispose women to an increased risk of breast and ovarian 
cancer.47 Women with family histories of these diseases often want to 
determine whether they have inherited harmful genetic mutations so that they 
can take precautions to mitigate their risk.48 For many years, Myriad was the 
only commercial provider of such a test in the United States,49 due to their 
portfolio of patents surrounding the test.50 
 A woman obtaining BRCA testing from Myriad typically receives one 
of three straightforward results: her genes either are normal, contain sequence 
variations which are harmless, or contain a clearly harmful mutation.51 But in 
some cases, the genetic sequence is difficult to interpret, and a test returns a 
 
47. See Mary-Claire King, “The Race” to Clone BRCA1, 343 SCI. 1462, 1462 (2014). 
48. These precautions may include everything from increased screening to a prophylactic 
double mastectomy. See, e.g., Angelina Jolie, My Medical Choice, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2013), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/14/opinion/my-medical-choice.html [https://perma.cc/4RTL-XS6N]. 
49. King, supra note 47, at 1465. 
50. Robert Cook-Deegan et al., The Next Controversy in Genetic Testing: Clinical Data as 
Trade Secrets?, 21 EUR. J. HUM. GENETICS 585, 585 (2013) (“[Myriad’s] status as the sole commercial 
provider of BRCA testing in the United States is a consequence of its exclusive US patent rights.”). 
51. John M. Conley et. al., Myriad After Myriad: The Proprietary Data Dilemma, 15 N.C. J. 
L. & TECH. 597, 613-14 (2014). 
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“VUS” result: a variant of unknown significance.52 A VUS results when a 
woman’s BRCA gene has a mutation, but the clinical importance of that 
mutation is not known.53 Perhaps it will be harmless, or perhaps it suggests an 
increased risk of developing breast cancer. 
When Myriad’s first tests came on the market in 1996, over 40% of tests 
returned a VUS result.54 By 2002, the numbers had dropped, but 12.8% of all 
Myriad’s tests still returned VUS results, a figure that was as high as 38.6% for 
African-American women.55 But by 2012, the overall VUS rate had declined to 
just 2.9%, and to 5.0% among African-American women.56 Myriad was able to 
leverage its large, proprietary database of genetic sequences to improve its 
ability to interpret VUS. John Conley and others have explained the lengths to 
which Myriad will go to understand the importance of a VUS: 
 
When Myriad finds a new VUS—or one previously identified but whose clinical 
significance is not yet understood—it offers free testing to the patient’s family 
members in an effort to help determine the variant’s significance. 
Myriad encourages the person with the VUS to contact others in their family, 
providing a model letter that patients can send their relatives. Myriad collects 
data regarding the clinical outcome associated with that VUS, and a VUS may 
ultimately be reclassified as deleterious or neutral as more is learned.57 
 
From an innovation-policy perspective (returning to the significant access 
concerns infra), the improvements in Myriad’s tests over the years are a 
success story of an intermediate technology. Myriad was able to bring its test to 
market when the product was still an intermediate one: it had some predictive 
value, but significant improvements were still needed, and were foreseen. It 
had clinical value at the time for some patients, but for nearly half of women 
receiving the test, their results were inconclusive. However, that very act of 
coming to market was necessary to enable Myriad to construct the database of 
genetic test results it used to bring down the VUS rate. If regulators had 
required a lower VUS rate before Myriad came to market, it is not clear when 
(if ever) Myriad would have been able to aggregate the kind of information 
necessary to meet that goal. 
 
52. Brenda M. Simon & Ted Sichelman, Data-Generating Patents, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 377, 
394 (2017). These are sometimes referred to as variants of uncertain significance. See, e.g., Amelia 
Smith Rinehart, Myriad Lessons Learned, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1147, 1157 (2015). 
53. Barbara J. Evans, Economic Regulation of Next-Generation Sequencing, 42 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 51, 53-54 (2014). 
54. Julie M. Eggington et al., Current Variant of Uncertain Significance Rates in BRCA1/2 
and Lynch Syndrome Testing, AM. C. OF MED. GENETICS (Mar. 2012), http://myriad-
library.s3.amazonaws.com/posters/VUS-Rate-ACMG.pdf [https://perma.cc/EC5H-CT69]. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. This number continues to decline, according to Myriad’s own reporting. Rapid Decline 
in VUS Rates, MYRIAD GENETICS (2016), https://new.myriadpro.com/products/myriad-myrisk/myriad-
myrisk-variant-classification/rapid-decline-in-vus-rates [https://perma.cc/TZ9M-9V65]. 
57. Conley et al., supra note 51, at 615 (citations omitted). 
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Myriad was able to bring its test to market as early as it did because of the 
much less onerous regulatory pathway facing most diagnostic tests. Unlike 
prescription drugs, the majority of genetic tests do not receive FDA scrutiny 
before coming to market,58 meaning that they can avoid the expensive, lengthy 
FDA clinical trial process. These tests do receive some regulatory examination, 
most notably through CMS, which oversees laboratory tests under authority 
established by the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988 
(CLIA).59 But  CMS’ examination is limited to questions of analytical validity, 
i.e., whether the test finds what it is supposed to find. In other words, CMS 
asks whether Myriad’s test accurately detects the presence or absence of those 
specific mutations in her genes.60 CMS does not ask about the test’s clinical 
validity, i.e., whether Myriad’s test provides the woman with any information 
about the likelihood that she may develop breast or ovarian cancer.61 
Not only was Myriad able to come to market early in the development 
process of the technology, but the patents it held over its tests enabled it to 
exclude other BRCA test providers from the market and thereby to aggregate 
the data it used to improve its test over time.62 Myriad’s patents on the BRCA 
genes were largely struck down by the Supreme Court in 2013,63 enabling 
competitors to enter the market. However, Myriad’s already aggregated 
database of test results64 and its lower VUS rate65 have allowed it to retain 
much of its clinical superiority. 
 
58. SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH & SOC’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., GENE PATENTS AND LICENSING PRACTICES AND THEIR IMPACT ON PATIENT ACCESS 
TO GENETIC TESTS 61 (2010). In 2014, the FDA took steps toward regulating these tests, see Draft 
Guidance Framework for Regulatory Oversight of Laboratory Developed Tests, 79 Fed. Reg. 59776, 
59776 (Oct. 3, 2014), but it later abandoned that initiative. More recently, the FDA and CMS have 
created a Task Force on LDT Quality Requirements, the output of which remains to be seen. Jeffrey 
Shuren & Patrick H. Conway, FDA and CMS Form Task Force on LDT Quality Requirements, CMS 
BLOG (Apr. 17, 2015), https://www.cms.gov/blog/fda-and-cms-form-task-force-ldt-quality-requirements 
[https://perma.cc/42J3-AXDX]. 
59. Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-578, 102 Stat. 
2903 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 263a (2018)). 
60. Sachs, supra note 5, at 1892. 
61. Id. New York state has a particularly robust laboratory certification program that does 
provide some review for clinical validity, Comprehensive Test Approval Policy and Submission 
Guidelines, N.Y. DEP’T OF HEALTH 1 (2013), http://www.wadsworth.org/labcert/TestApproval/forms/
Submission_Guidelines_Policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/KCU7-GTEC], but this review is typically based 
on scientific literature rather than clinical trials, SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH & 
SOC’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., U.S. SYSTEM OF OVERSIGHT OF GENETIC TESTING 
36, 98-99 (2008). 
62. Simon & Sichelman, supra note 52, at 378; Rinehart, supra note 52, at 1157. 
63. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013). 
64. Professors Brenda Simon and Ted Sichelman have referred to patents like Myriad’s as 
“data-generating patents,” which “generate data that is distinct from the operation and use of the 
invention itself.” Simon & Sichelman, supra note 52, at 379. That information is then held as a trade 
secret, see Jacob S. Sherkow, Cancer’s IP, 96 N.C. L. REV. 297, 344-45 (2018), so these patents enable 
their holders to retain their monopoly position even once the patents expire or are invalidated, Simon & 
Sichelman, supra note 52, at 379-80. 
65. See Conley et al., supra note 51, at 614 (“Myriad has claimed that the fraction of cases 
resulting in a VUS is 3% in its hands, versus 20% for its European competitors.”). 
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Yet the legal tools that enabled Myriad to come to market early in the 
development process and establish a monopoly position created a significant 
social harm: they allowed Myriad to set the price of the test quite high and limit 
access for many women who wanted the test (either directly or by preventing 
them from obtaining a second opinion).66 In the early 2000s, even as more than 
one-in-ten women received a VUS result, Myriad’s BRACAnalysis test retailed 
for $2,600.67 The Myriad example raises questions about whether intermediate 
technologies with known limitations (such as a high VUS rate) should be 
permitted to exercise unconstrained rights of exclusion, or whether 
accommodations are needed as a technology improves. 
Myriad’s test is in many ways a paradigmatic example of an intermediate 
technology. Although Myriad’s test did benefit many women at the time it was 
initially marketed, for many others the test did not provide them with the 
information they sought.68 But as the test was improved over time, the 
fundamental technology did not change. Myriad is a case of improving and 
refining an existing technology, in contrast to other examples of intermediate 
technologies. Myriad is not alone in this category. Most obviously, it is joined 
by the providers of other diagnostic tests, who seek to refine and improve their 
therapeutic value to patients. But more recently, it is also being joined by the 
providers of artificial intelligence or machine-learning algorithms and their 
application to the health care context.69 
2. Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Processes 
 A second example is broader in scope than the previous case: 
pharmaceutical manufacturing processes. As the FDA itself has phrased the 
situation, “not much has changed in pharmaceutical production over the last 50 
or so years.”70 Professor W. Nicholson Price has most thoroughly written about 
this problem, in which scientific advances in pharmaceutical manufacturing lag 
behind manufacturing advances in other fields, such as food products or 
 
66. Rinehart, supra note 52, at 1175. 
67. Jorge L. Contreras, Narratives of Gene Patenting, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1133, 1147 
(2016); see also Bryn Williams-Jones, History of a Gene Patent: Tracing the Development and 
Application of Commercial BRCA Testing, 10 HEALTH L.J. 123, 134 (2002) (describing history of 
Myriad’s pricing). Myriad now charges over four thousand dollars for this test. Robert Cook-Deegan & 
Annie Niehaus, After Myriad: Genetic Testing in the Wake of Recent Supreme Court Decisions About 
Gene Patents, 2 CURRENT GENETIC MED. REPS. 223, 228 (2014). 
68. Eggington et al., supra note 54. 
69. See, e.g., W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Black-Box Medicine, 116 MICH. L. REV. 421, 
423-24 (2017). Scholars in related fields have noted many of the additional oversight challenges posed 
by algorithms like these. See generally, Pauline T. Kim, Auditing Algorithms for Discrimination, 166 U. 
PA. L. REV. ONLINE 189 (2017). 
70. Lawrence Yu, Continuous Manufacturing Has a Strong Impact on Drug Quality, R&D 
(Apr. 13, 2016), https://www.rdmag.com/blog/2016/04/continuous-manufacturing-has-strong-impact-
drug-quality [https://perma.cc/NB8A-SGPB]. 
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consumer goods.71 Even as pharmaceutical companies develop innovative new 
drugs, they often use “outdated production techniques and old manufacturing 
plants” in producing those drugs.72 
 One indicator of these outdated techniques is the widespread use of 
batch manufacturing rather than continuous manufacturing.73 Even today, the 
vast majority of the pharmaceutical industry uses batch manufacturing 
methods,74 in which drugs are made in a number of discrete steps, after each of 
which production stops to ensure quality testing can be completed.75 However, 
manufacturers could move to a system of continuous manufacturing, in which 
products are made through more of an assembly-line, uninterrupted start-to-
finish process. 
Pharmaceutical companies’ continued reliance on older manufacturing 
techniques, including batch manufacturing, is concerning for efficiency and 
cost reasons, and for patient safety reasons. First, the FDA notes that 
continuous manufacturing “saves time, reduces the likelihood for human error, 
and can respond more nimbly to market changes.”76 Each break in the batch 
manufacturing process is an opportunity for “inefficiency and delay, as well as 
the increased possibility of defects and error.”77 The National Science and 
Technology Council has estimated that shifting to continuous manufacturing 
may reduce manufacturing costs “by up to 40 to 50 percent.”78 
Second, manufacturing problems are also closely tied to drug recalls or 
shortages, which can harm patient care.79 In 2017, 37% of drug shortages were 
due to quality issues involving manufacturing,80 including “bacterial or mold 
contamination, tablet disintegration, and the presence of foreign particles such 
 
71. See generally W. Nicholson Price II, Making Do in Making Drugs: Innovation Policy and 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturing, 55 B.C. L. REV. 491 (2014); see also Leila Abboud & Scott Hensley, 
New Prescription for Drug Makers: Update the Plants, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 3, 2003, 12:01 AM ET), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10625358403931000 [https://perma.cc/FG9T-7LGV] (noting that 
pharmaceutical manufacturing is “far behind [that] of potato-chip and laundry-soap makers”). 
72. Price, supra note 71, at 493. 
73. Id. at 502. 
74. See infra note 85 for the FDA’s promotion of rare instances of continuous manufacturing. 
75. Id.; see also Sau Lee, Modernizing the Way Drugs Are Made: A Transition to Continuous 
Manufacturing, SPOTLIGHT ON CDER SCIENCE (May 17, 2017), 
https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/NewsEvents/ucm557448.htm [https://perma.cc/AF26-9RH8] (describing 
continuous- vs. batch-manufacturing processes). 
76. Lee, supra note 75. 
77. Yu, supra note 70. 
78. Advanced Manufacturing: A Snapshot of Priority Technology Areas Across the Federal 
Government, NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL 29 (2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
whitehouse.gov/files/images/Blog/NSTC%20SAM%20technology%20areas%20snapshot.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3E6J-EUJX]. 
79. Hanan Shaban et al., Impact of Drug Shortages on Patient Safety and Pharmacy 
Operation Costs, FED. PRACTITIONER, Jan. 2018, at 24, 31. 
80. Drug Shortages, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (2017), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/
DrugSafety/DrugShortages/UCM441583.pdf [https://perma.cc/4SH3-3A95]. 
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as glass or metal in vials.”81 Another 27% of shortages were due to quality 
issues involving delays,82 such as when “embedded quality problems with one 
product forces closure of a production line or facility for repairs, resulting in 
shortage of other products.”83 These shortages are also costly to our health care 
system and may result in $230 million in additional costs annually for 
hospitals.84 
So why do pharmaceutical companies still use outdated production 
methods?85 In short, the regulatory structure. Initially, the patent system does 
not provide pharmaceutical companies with sufficient incentives to innovate in 
the development of new manufacturing processes. Although pharmaceutical 
companies can obtain patents on innovations in manufacturing technologies, 
those patents are extremely difficult to enforce.86 A pharmaceutical company 
typically cannot determine if its competitors are using its patented 
manufacturing technology just from observing the sale of their finished 
products, so it is difficult for companies to detect infringement of their method 
claims.87 As a result, companies often do not want to incur the costs of 
disclosing their innovations publicly (as is required to obtain a patent) if they 
cannot gain the benefits of excluding others from using their technologies.88 
Further, the FDA approval process both encourages companies to begin 
production using older manufacturing techniques and makes it costly for 
companies to update those processes later in a drug’s life cycle. When seeking 
 
81. Sandra L. Kweder & S. Dill, Drug Shortages: The Cycle of Quantity and Quality, 93 
CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY THERAPEUTICS 245, 247 (2013). 
82. Drug Shortages, supra note 80. 
83. Kweder & Dill, supra note 81, at 247. 
84. Drug Shortages, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS 5 (2017), http://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/
assets/2017/01/drug_shortages.pdf [https://perma.cc/T5UY-FQD7]. 
85. Because of the dynamics described here involving manufacturing and trade secrecy, it is 
difficult to determine exactly how many companies are actually using continuous-manufacturing 
methods. However, the FDA itself continues to note that “most drug makers” still use older 
manufacturing methods. See Scott Gottlieb, FDA Budget Matters: Investing in Advanced Domestic 
Manufacturing, FDA VOICE (July 13, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/fda-voices-perspectives-
fda-leadership-and-experts/fda-budget-matters-investing-advanced-domestic-manufacturing 
[https://perma.cc/DP8H-S6LK]. To date, the FDA publicly cites only two examples of companies using 
continuous manufacturing methods: Vertex, which has used continuous manufacturing for its cystic-
fibrosis product Orkambi since its approval in 2015, and Janssen, which received FDA approval in 2016 
to change the production of its HIV product Prezista from batch to continuous manufacturing. See Yu, 
supra note 70; Michael Kopcha, Continuous Manufacturing - Common Guiding Principles Can Help 
Ensure Progress, AM. PHARMACEUTICAL REV. (Sept. 13, 2017), 
https://www.americanpharmaceuticalreview.com/2727-Blog/342223-Continuous-Manufacturing-
Common-Guiding-Principles-Can-Help-Ensure-Progress [https://perma.cc/RML2-ZC5L]. Although 
there may be others, the agency portrays these two as notable exceptions to the general practice of batch 
manufacturing. 
86. Price, supra note 71, at 526. This is true for a variety of reasons, including that process 
patents are often easier to design around than are product patents, since each step of the process must be 
performed to qualify as infringement. See, e.g., Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 572 
U.S. 915, 921-22 (2014). 
87. Price, supra note 71, at 526. 
88. Id.; see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y 
L. & ETHICS 717, 722-23 (2005) (describing drug patenting practices). 
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initial approval, companies may be reticent to ask the FDA to approve a 
product using a novel, untested manufacturing procedure for fear that it will 
delay approval (increasing the company’s costs and eating into their patent-
protected time on the market) or even lead to a rejection.89 Pharmaceutical 
companies can point to specific historical examples of this practice.90 
Therefore, even if today’s FDA is more willing to approve such processes (as it 
is suggesting publicly),91 risk-averse companies may understandably err on the 
side of using older manufacturing techniques at first. 
But companies will also find it difficult to update those manufacturing 
processes once their products are on the market.92 The FDA requires companies 
seeking to make changes to approved products to notify the agency before 
doing so.93 And for “major” changes—a category that includes any change in 
the “production process” with a “substantial potential to have an adverse effect 
on the identity, strength, quality, purity, or potency of the drug product”94—the 
company must obtain the FDA’s permission before implementing the change.95 
The expense, time, and risk of this additional approval process may dissuade 
companies from seeking such changes. 
The existing regulatory frameworks combine to lock in manufacturing 
processes at an intermediate stage of development and have essentially frozen 
our pharmaceutical manufacturing systems several decades in the past. 
Helpfully, the FDA recognizes that pharmaceutical companies will not adopt 
novel manufacturing processes until the FDA “create[s] a clear path toward 
their adoption, and provide[s] more regulatory certainty that changing over to a 
new manufacturing system won’t be an obstacle.”96 To that end, the FDA and 
other actors have begun to take steps toward addressing the problem. For 
instance, in 2016, the 21st Century Cures Act gave the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services the authority to award grants “for the purpose of studying and 
recommending improvements to the process of continuous manufacturing of 
drugs and biological products.”97 If the structure of the patent system does not 
provide sufficient incentives for companies to develop new manufacturing 
technologies, as noted above, it may be that public investment in those 
 
89. Price, supra note 71, at 512-14. 
90. Id. at 513 (explaining the FDA’s repeated rejections of companies who wanted to use high 
performance liquid chromatography techniques in their manufacturing processes). 
91. See, e.g., Gottlieb, supra note 85. 
92. Price, supra note 71, at 516-18. 
93. 21 C.F.R. § 314.70 (2019). 
94. Id. § 314.70(b)(1). 
95. Id. § 314.70(b)(3). 
96. Gottlieb, supra note 85. 
97. 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 3016, 130 Stat. 1033, 1095 (2016) 
(codified at 21 U.S.C. § 399h). The administration’s proposed budget for FY 2019 requests $58 million 
to invest in advanced manufacturing techniques of this type. See Scott Gottlieb, President’s Fiscal Year 
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technologies is needed to modernize these processes.98 However, the regulatory 
and legislative environment in this area has not yet changed,99 so incentives for 
manufacturers to modernize their manufacturing processes remain weak at 
present. 
The case of pharmaceutical manufacturing represents a different kind of 
intermediate technology than does diagnostic testing. In some ways, the end 
product itself of course remains constant—the pharmaceutical. This case of 
process improvements into existing technologies is nevertheless one of 
intermediacy, as the goal remains one of technological improvement in a 
particular field over time. Process improvements, rather than substantive 
improvements, should be thought of as no less subject to the qualities of 
intermediacy I focus on here, bringing this paper in agreement with Merges and 
Nelson’s framing of them as “cumulative” technologies.100 
3. Tissue as a Platform Technology 
A third set of examples comes in the area of human tissues and their 
possible uses in the medical field. To choose a specific area within this broader 
category, in recent years, scientific interest in the microbiome, the community 
of microbes that lives within each of our bodies and exists in a symbiotic 
relationship with our own cells,101 has exploded.102 Scientists have linked the 
microbiome to a vast range of human diseases: autoimmune disorders like 
diabetes and arthritis; mental health conditions like schizophrenia and 
depression; and to a range of conditions affecting our intestinal systems, 
including Crohn’s disease and antibiotic-resistant infections.103 One day, 
scientists may be able to cure diseases not by administering typical medicines, 
which may achieve their goals while simultaneously imposing harmful side 
effects, but rather by altering the balance of our bodies’ own internal flora. 
As yet, however, only one effective microbiome-based treatment has been 
developed: fecal microbiota transplantation (FMT) for the treatment of 
recurrent Clostridium difficile infections. C. difficile is the most common 
 
98. See Kapczynski & Syed, supra note 16. 
99. The FDA has sought public comment on the topic of “best practices” regarding the 
development of continuous manufacturing technologies. See Submission of Proposed Recommendations 
for Industry on Developing Continuous Manufacturing of Solid Dosage Drug Products in 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturing; Establishment of a Public Docket, 82 Fed. Reg. 28664, 28665 (June 23, 
2017). 
100. Merges & Nelson, supra note 32, at 883, 898. 
101. ED YONG, I CONTAIN MULTITUDES 5 (2016). 
102. See, e.g., Innovations in the Microbiome, SCI. AM. (Feb. 17, 2015), 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/report/innovations-in-the-microbiome [https://perma.cc/7E88-
J8E3]; Microbes Maketh Man, ECONOMIST (Aug. 18, 2012), 
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2012/08/18/microbes-maketh-man [https://perma.cc/QGM8-
WEHX]. 
103. Dirk Gevers et al., The Treatment-Naïve Microbiome in New-Onset Crohn’s Disease, 15 
CELL HOST & MICROBE 382 (2014). Some of these links have stronger scientific support than others, 
but it is clear that the microbiome plays a key role in maintaining human health. 
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hospital-acquired infection,104 and it takes a large—and growing105—toll on our 
health care system and on the health of American patients.106 To put it simply, 
FMT is the transfer of stool from a healthy donor into the bowel of a patient. 
The cure rate for those who experience two or more recurrences of C. difficile 
infection and receive a fecal transplant is 90%—far beyond the 30-to-40% 
chance they face with standard antibiotic medicines.107 
Unfortunately, microbiome-based treatments have not demonstrated the 
same success in preliminary trials for other conditions. One recent randomized, 
placebo-controlled trial of FMT in ulcerative colitis showed moderate efficacy 
overall, but nearly all of that efficacy was traceable to patients receiving 
samples from a single donor.108 Patients receiving samples from other donors 
did not experience as good clinical outcomes on average.109 Scientists do not 
yet know why this donor’s stool is particularly effective at treating patients 
with ulcerative colitis, but they are continuing to study the question. 
 Studies like these serve as important reminders of how much we have 
yet to learn about the microbiome—in other words, how the existing 
technologies are intermediate in nature. The use of stool is a bridge or platform 
technology.110 Scientists and physicians do not hope that fecal transplants will 
still be the norm a decade from now. Instead, the hope is that scientists will 
learn more about which microbes, or even which genes, are most important for 
the healthy functioning of our gut microbiomes, allowing scientists to culture 
specific strains of bacteria, genetically engineer microbes, or isolate 
metabolites to fight and prevent disease. But we are not there yet. 
 A key concern at this time is that the two primary regulatory structures 
operating around the microbiome, FDA approval and patent protection, may 
 
104. Shelley S. Magill et al., Multistate Point-Prevalence Survey of Health Care-Associated 
Infections, 370 N. ENG. J. MED. 1198, 1198 (2014). 
105. The number of C. difficile infections doubled between 2000 and 2005, Marya D. 
Zilberberg, Andrew F. Shorr & Marin H. Kollef, Increase in Adult Clostridium Difficile-Related 
Hospitalizations and Case-Fatality Rate, United States, 2000-2005, 14 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE 
929, 929 (2008), and hospitalizations due to these infections doubled between 2000 and 2010, Fernanda 
C. Lessa, et al., Burden of Clostridium Difficile Infection in the United States, 372 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 
825, 826 (2015). 
106. C. difficile causes more than twenty-nine thousand deaths in the U.S. each year, National 
Action Plan for Combating Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria, WHITE HOUSE 60 (Mar. 2015), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/national_action_plan_for_combating_antibotic-
resistant_bacteria.pdf [https://perma.cc/69VH-7R3E], and it is estimated to cost our health care system 
$4.8 billion annually, Erik R. Dubberke & Margaret A. Olsen, Burden of Clostridium Difficile on the 
Health Care System, 55 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES S88, S88 (2012). 
107. Gauree G. Konijeti et al., Cost-Effectiveness of Competing Strategies for Management of 
Recurrent Clostridium Difficile Infection: A Decision Analysis, 58 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 
1507, 1511 (2014). 
108. Paul Moayyedi et al., Fecal Microbiota Transplantation Induces Remission in Patients 
with Active Ulcerative Colitis in a Randomized Controlled Trial, 149 GASTROENTEROLOGY 102, 105 
(2015). 
109. Id. 
110. Rachel E. Sachs & Carolyn A. Edelstein, Ensuring the Safe and Effective FDA 
Regulation of Fecal Microbiota Transplantation, 2 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 396, 413 (2015). 
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make it difficult to develop the next generation of therapies, building on the 
foundation of evidence developed from FMT and related research. First, the 
FDA has chosen to regulate microbiome-based therapies as biologic drugs, 
rather than under its paradigms for regulating human tissues like blood.111 That 
decision requires microbiome companies to traverse the lengthy, expensive 
clinical trial process before bringing microbiome-based therapies to market. It 
is true that the FDA review process generates critical information about new 
health care technologies and serves important public health purposes.112 For 
pharmaceuticals that more closely resemble the Merges & Nelson ideal of a 
discrete innovation representing an end in itself,113 the FDA approval process 
may not pose concerns for follow-on innovation. 
 However, in the microbiome context, there is reason to think that 
applying the standard FDA review process to these new therapies may slow or 
stifle the development of new information about the microbiome’s relationship 
to different diseases. Under the standard FDA approval model, once a new drug 
is approved for a particular indication, doctors are typically free to prescribe 
that drug for any use, even ones not listed on the label or studied by the 
manufacturer.114 Approving FMT or even a collection of cultured microbes for 
use in the treatment of recurrent C. difficile infections would permit physicians 
to prescribe that product for other, unproven indications, when it is the 
development of new information about those indications that society needs 
most intensely. 
What company would do clinical trials on those new indications when 
there is a risk they might fail and when their product can be sold for these 
indications anyway?115 This question—how to encourage pharmaceutical 
companies to invest in studying new uses for existing drugs116—is a broader 
one that has been studied in the literature, but typically in contexts where the 
biological basis for the drug in question was more well-understood than it is in 
the microbiome context and where the FDA did not have a choice about how to 
regulate the product in question.117 In this case, the FDA made a choice to 
regulate microbiome-based technologies as biologic drugs. That choice has 
implications for innovation incentives in this field. 
 
111. Sachs & Edelstein, supra note 110, at 410-12. Importantly, this was not obviously 
required by existing statutes and regulations. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1) (2018) (defining “drug”); 42 
U.S.C. § 262(i)(1) (2018) (defining “biological product”); 21 C.F.R. § 1271.3(d)(3) (2019) (defining 
human cells and tissues). 
112. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. 
& TECH. L. REV. 345 (2007). 
113. See supra text accompanying notes 32-44 (explaining Merges & Nelson’s taxonomy). 
114. David C. Radley et al., Off-label Prescribing Among Office-Based Physicians, 166 
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1021, 1021 (2006). 
115. See Kapczynski & Syed, supra note 16, at 1926-27. 
116. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 
717, 720-21 (2005); Rachel E. Sachs, Paul B. Ginsburg, & Dana P. Goldman, Encouraging New Uses 
for Old Drugs, 24 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2421 (2017). 
117. See Sachs & Edelstein, supra note 110, at 413 n.109. 
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But the impact of the FDA approval process on innovation in the 
microbiome field cannot be understood alone. The interaction of the FDA 
approval process with a second regulatory structure—the patent system—has 
implications for innovation as well. Thus far, it has proven difficult for 
researchers to obtain patents on the current generation of microbiome therapies, 
chiefly those using FMT techniques or those studying cultures of specific 
bacterial strains.118 If it were inexpensive to bring new microbiome-based 
therapies to market, perhaps the paucity of patent protection in this field would 
not be a warning sign for innovation. But the FDA’s decision to impose the 
traditional pharmaceutical approval process on microbiome-based therapies 
renders the development process lengthy and expensive, and it is typically 
thought that patents are a critical incentive for encouraging companies to 
develop new pharmaceuticals and to transact in the informational goods 
necessary to complete that process.119 
At present, some companies developing microbiome-based therapies are 
moving forward by relying on thin patent protection, combined with trade 
secrecy and the promise of FDA exclusivity periods that provide patent-like 
protection after a new drug is approved.120 But others are likely opting out. At 
least some number of microbiome companies are looking at the regulatory 
landscape and choosing to develop products that will not be subject to FDA 
regulation. In short, it’s possible that the existing regulatory structures are 
dissuading investors and companies from developing the current generation of 
microbiome-based therapies, raising questions about whether future 
generations will be developed. 
 This third set of intermediate technologies can be conceived of as 
broader in nature: platform technologies that lay the foundation for expansion 
of existing technologies, indications, or uses. In some ways, this set of 
examples is different in kind from the previous two situations. The recognition 
of the platform nature of the technology may counsel in favor of different 
approaches that allow greater room for future experimentation and latitude than 
in the context of iterative improvements in a particular, existing technology. 
 One question raised by this diversity of examples is simple: isn’t 
everything intermediate in some meaningful way? More specifically, if my 
examples of intermediate technologies display such different characteristics, 
 
118. See Rachel E. Sachs, The Uneasy Case for Patent Law, 117 MICH. L. REV. 499, 528 
(2018). 
119. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 
1575, 1617 (2003); FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF 
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY ch. 3, at 14 (2003). 
120. Once a new drug is approved by the FDA, its sponsor will typically receive an FDA-
administered exclusivity period for that drug. Depending on the type of drug involved, companies will 
receive either five, seven, or twelve years of exclusivity to market their drug, although these 
exclusivities differ by type and precise mechanics. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii) (2018) (Hatch-
Waxman Act, conferring a five-year period of exclusivity for small-molecule drugs); Id. § 360cc(a) 
(Orphan Drug Act, conferring seven years of market exclusivity); 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(A) (2018) 
(Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act, conferring twelve years of data exclusivity). 
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don’t the broader categories of regulated technologies that they represent cover 
the vast majority of technologies we might be concerned about? I have 
presented the above examples as discrete sets of inventions, but these examples 
might instead cover nearly the entire regulated field. 
 It is at least possible that this is the case. If so, however, it is important 
to consider what challenges, if any, this might pose to the overall inquiry. My 
core claim—that there is a set of technologies in need of this type of iterative 
improvement but where regulatory barriers exist to that improvement—would 
still hold even if the class of intermediate technologies is broader than I 
currently describe. With exceptions as described infra in Part II, existing 
regulations do not acknowledge the vast majority of technologies as 
intermediate, and they certainly do not acknowledge that technologies currently 
viewed as end stage (such as small-molecule drugs) are instead intermediate. 
This broader view would suggest that I have identified an even larger problem, 
in need of even more solutions, than I have otherwise articulated. 
 It is also possible that this question really reflects a clash between old 
and new forms of technological innovation, particularly in the life sciences and 
the pace at which those forms evolve. Small-molecule drugs, even if they 
eventually lead to new discoveries, do not approach the intermediacy displayed 
by medical algorithms or software on any reasonable timescale. The 1962 
amendments to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act giving the FDA new 
authority to regulate drugs121 had in mind small-molecule drugs, as that was the 
particular type of technology the agency was faced with, not technologies that 
would come to prominence a half century or more later. A regulatory paradigm 
based around older technology is now in place to shape the development of 
very different kinds of technologies. 
II. Existing Doctrinal Approaches to Temporal Regulation 
Although the question of intermediacy has not been explicitly dealt with 
in the literature, different areas of law have dealt with related questions. First, 
patent law contains a set of doctrines designed to mediate between the interests 
of first inventors and subsequent improvers. Second, food and drug law has 
more specifically considered the problem of intermediacy in the context of 
health care software. Third, environmental law scholars and practitioners have 
developed a theory of adaptive management, in which agencies are able to alter 
their regulations in the face of new information or changing conditions. Fourth 
and finally, isolated doctrines within reimbursement policy can be understood 
within the intermediate-technology framework. 
 
121. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (codified as amended at 21 
U.S.C. § 355). 
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A. Patent Law 
As noted in Part I supra, there is a strong history of intellectual property 
scholarship examining the question of cumulative or sequential innovation.122 
The fundamental question is one of patent scope: how broadly or narrowly 
should initial innovators be granted protection over their invention? Some 
scholars (most notably Professor Edmund Kitch) have argued that granting 
broad, initial patents will best incentivize full development of a particular 
technological field,123 while others have argued that broad patenting, 
particularly in fields characterized by “cumulative innovation” of the Merges 
and Nelson variety, is highly likely to stifle full development.124 Many 
doctrines within patent law are tied explicitly or implicitly to this question of 
scope, but there are two doctrines in particular—blocking patents and the 
reverse doctrine of equivalents—which deal specifically with the rights of 
improvers. 
The typical situation contemplated in the case of blocking patents has 
been expressed succinctly by Professor Arti Rai: 
 
[T]he second-generation inventor comes up with a patentable (that is, novel and 
nonobvious) improvement on the first-generation invention. Although the 
second-generation improvement is independently patentable, it nonetheless 
incorporates the first-generation invention and therefore infringes the first 
inventor's patent. In order to practice its improvement, the second-generation 
inventor must therefore seek a license from the first-generation inventor. 
(Conversely, if the first-generation inventor wants to practice the improvement, 
it must seek a license from the improver.)125 
 
The first- and second-generation patents “block” each other in the sense 
that each patentee must seek a license from the other before being able to 
practice their invention.126 Although ideally such licensing will occur, both 
 
122. See, e.g., Kevin Emerson Collins, Getting into the “Spirit” of Innovative Things: Looking 
to Complementary and Substitute Properties to Shape Patent Protection for Improvements, 26 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1217, 1271-72 (2011); Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in 
Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 991-92 (1997); Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the 
Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 33-35 (1991). 
123. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 
275-80 (1977). 
124. See, e.g., Merges & Nelson, supra note 32, at 872-73; Arti K. Rai, Fostering Cumulative 
Innovation in the Biopharmaceutical Industry: The Role of Patents and Antitrust, 16 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 813, 831 (2001). 
125. Rai, supra note 124, at 833. Professor Kevin Collins refers to the situation envisioned 
here as one involving “classic improvements,” hypothesizing additional relationships between initial and 
subsequent patentees and their technologies. Collins, supra note 122, at 1272-73. 
126. For examples of this phenomenon, see Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and 
Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75, 84 (1994). 
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theory and practice predict that in many cases the various rightsholders will be 
unable to reach an agreement.127 
The reverse doctrine of equivalents goes further. In the case of moderate 
improvements to existing technologies, improvers may obtain blocking patents, 
even as they are also liable for infringement (in the event they attempt to 
practice the initial patent in question). But in the case of more radical 
improvements,128 improvers may not only obtain a patent—they may be able to 
escape infringement entirely. An equitable doctrine, the purpose of the reverse 
doctrine of equivalents is to “prevent unwarranted extension of the claims 
beyond a fair scope of the patentee’s invention.”129 Particularly in situations 
where “a device is so far changed in principle from a patented article that it 
performs the same or a similar function in a substantially different way, 
but nevertheless falls within the literal words of the claim,”130 courts may limit 
the potential scope of a patentee’s claims. Although the reverse doctrine of 
equivalents has lost favor with the Federal Circuit today,131 some academics 
have called for the doctrine to be revitalized.132 
Taken together, blocking patents and the reverse doctrine of equivalents 
encapsulate particular views about the relationship between initial and 
subsequent improvements in technology. Minor improvements may fall within 
the scope of an initial patent and may not receive any benefit for their efforts. 
Significant improvements may be able to be patented, even as they are subject 
to the constraint of an earlier patent. And radical improvements may be able to 
avoid infringement liability entirely.133 
These scholarly debates also represent particular views about how many 
actors might be involved in the development of a particular technology. Kitch 
envisions a single initial innovator who is driven to develop (either on their 
own or through licensing) a particular technology, whereas Professor Suzanne 
Scotchmer, Rai, and others envision competing inventors driving progress 
forward. 
In the intermediate-technologies context, it is not clear that one of these 
models will dominate. In the case of improvements to existing technologies (in 
the Myriad case), it might be more likely for a single innovator to focus on 
improving their technology,134 whereas in the case of expansions of existing 
technologies, competing inventors may be more likely. 
 
127. Rai, supra note 124, at 833-35. 
128. See Lemley, supra note 122, at 1010. 
129. Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 
1991). 
130. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608-09 (1950). 
131. See Samuel F. Ernst, The Lost Precedent of the Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents, 18 
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 467, 472-73 (2016). 
132. See id. at 496. 
133. See Lemley, supra note 122, at 1007-10. 
134. Even in this case, Kitch’s argument in support of a broad patent scope would not 
necessarily apply, as the particular technology involved is not necessarily an expansive one. 
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B. Food and Drug Regulation 
 The FDA currently employs two regulatory strategies in the medical 
device context that could inform an updated regulatory approach to 
intermediate technologies. First, the FDA’s procedure for evaluating new 
medical devices that make only incremental changes to existing devices is 
helpful in considering the relationship between existing technologies and 
potential improvements. Second, the FDA’s newer approach to regulating 
software in the medical device context provides an example of a technology-
specific accommodation that might have broader applications in the 
intermediate-technologies context. 
1. Incremental Improvements and the 510(k) Pathway 
 In the context of medical devices, the FDA oversees a regulatory 
framework that explicitly distinguishes between devices that make only 
incremental changes to existing products and devices that make more 
significant advances. This oversight has given the FDA experience in thinking 
about the relationships between existing technologies and new, improved 
technologies, in a way that is helpful in enabling the agency to identify possible 
situations of intermediate technologies. But this program has also provided the 
FDA with an appreciation for the ways in which altered regulatory barriers may 
encourage companies to move forward with the development of new 
technologies—and the ways in which that encouragement can come with costs. 
 The FDA employs a risk-based framework for the evaluation and 
approval of new medical devices. High-risk, or Class III, devices (such as an 
artificial heart)135 are subject to significant regulatory requirements, typically 
including a premarket approval (PMA) process resembling the set of clinical 
trials required in the pharmaceutical context, before they are permitted to come 
to market.136 By contrast, low-risk, or Class I, devices (such as a tongue 
depressor)137 are subject to relatively few requirements, such as adherence to 
good manufacturing practices, before they may be sold.138 Intermediate, or 
Class II, devices (such as wheelchairs)139 are those where the types of general 
controls governing Class I devices are insufficient, but the potential safety and 
efficacy concerns over the device’s use do not rise to the level observed for 
Class III devices.140 
 
135. Replacement Heart Valve, 21 C.F.R. § 870.3925 (2019). 
136. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C) (2018). 
137. Tongue Depressor, 21 C.F.R. § 880.6230. 
138. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A). 
139. Powered Wheelchair, 21 C.F.R. § 890.3860. 
140. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B). 
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 Class II devices may be required to pursue the full PMA process. Yet in 
the vast majority of cases,141 such devices are able to come to market through 
the 510(k) pathway.142 This pathway requires companies to demonstrate that 
their device is “substantially equivalent” to another approved device.143 Once 
they do so, companies are able to simply notify the FDA of their intention to 
market a new device, rather than wait for affirmative FDA approval.144 
Compared to the PMA process, the 510(k) pathway is significantly cheaper and 
quicker for companies.145 Not only are the fees companies must pay to the FDA 
for review of their device far higher in the PMA context,146 but the tens of 
millions of dollars needed to complete the clinical trial process for the PMA 
dwarf the costs associated with the 510(k) process.147 
 In many ways, it is helpful to think of the 510(k) process as mapping 
clearly onto the context of intermediate technologies. The initial justification 
for the 510(k) process was “to give manufacturers the opportunity to make 
small improvements on the devices already on the market,”148 just as it is my 
hope in the intermediate technologies context that companies will be able to 
improve existing technologies. The 510(k) pathway thus presents one example 
of a situation in which the FDA (in collaboration with Congress) has lowered 
the regulatory barriers for companies to engage in incremental changes, and 
particularly incremental improvements. More generally, the idea of decreasing 
regulatory barriers to improvements in existing technologies is one strategy to 
address the problem of intermediate technologies. 
 But this strategy comes with a cost. In particular, we might be 
concerned that regulatory barriers may be lowered too far, resulting in the 
approval of unsafe or inefficacious medical devices, harming patient care in at 
 
141. Jeffrey K. Shapiro, Substantial Equivalence Premarket Review: The Right Approach for 
Most Medical Devices, 69 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 365, 365 (2014) (“Of devices requiring premarket review, 
about 2% reach the market via premarket application (PMA) approval or the Humanitarian Device 
Exemption (HDE) variant, while the remaining 98% receive 510(k) clearance.”). 
142. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, §§ 510(k), 513(f), 52 Stat. 
1040 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 360(k), 360c(f) (2018)) (premarket notification process and 
substantial equivalence mechanism); see also Jonathan S. Kahan, Premarket Approval Versus 
Premarket Notification: Different Routes to the Same Market, 39 FOOD DRUG COSMETIC L.J. 510, 514-
15 (1984) (describing advantages of the 510(k) pathway). 
143. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(f)(1)(A)(ii) (2018). 
144. Premarket Notification 510(k), FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (2018), https://www.fda.gov/
MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/HowtoMarketYourDevice/PremarketSubmissions/
%20PremarketNotification510k/default.htm [https://perma.cc/V7S3-MQ9U]. 
145. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., FDA SHOULD TAKE STEPS TO ENSURE THAT HIGH-
RISK DEVICE TYPES ARE APPROVED THROUGH THE MOST STRINGENT PREMARKET REVIEW PROCESS 
15-16 (2009). 
146. FY 2019 MDUFA User Fees, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., (2018), https://www.fda.gov/
forindustry/userfees/medicaldeviceuserfee/ucm452519.htm [https://perma.cc/L744-XPRH] (setting the 
user fee for the 510(k) pathway at $10,953 and for the PMA process at $322,147). 
147. Adam Lewin, Medical Device Innovation in America: Tensions Between Food and Drug 
Law and Patent Law, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 403, 409 (2012). 
148. Diana Zuckerman et al., Medical Device Recalls and the FDA Approval Process, 171 
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1006, 1007 (2011). 
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least some cases. Indeed, the 510(k) process has been criticized along these 
lines (although the program has strong defenders as well149), leading the agency 
to propose reforms to the existing process.150 This tradeoff between speed of 
innovation and quality of information developed about a particular product is 
one the FDA makes in many different contexts, and it must be managed each 
time. The problem of intermediate technologies will be no different. 
2. Novel Approaches to Regulating Medical Software 
 The increasing development of digital health technologies over the last 
several years has created a number of challenges for the FDA and its traditional 
approval system for medical devices. The statutory definition of “device” is 
quite broad,151 and it encompasses a wide range of medical software, whether 
that software establishes a simple electronic health care record or screens 
images to detect the presence of cancer. But the FDA has also recognized that 
software is often a poor fit with the classic medical device approval paradigm, 
in at least two senses. First, the risks posed by medical software are often 
different in kind from those posed by traditional medical devices, making it 
difficult to fit medical software within the risk-based medical device approval 
system. And second, it is beneficial for some technologies—such as medical 
software—to be iterated and updated on a far faster timescale than is typical of 
standard medical devices. As a result, the FDA (sometimes with the assistance 
of Congress) has made accommodations in its regulatory process to address 
both of these differences. 
 As noted supra in Section II.B.1, the FDA oversees a risk-based 
framework for the evaluation and approval of new medical devices. The 
difference in potential risks to the patient from the use of a Class I device like a 
tongue depressor versus a Class III device like an artificial heart may seem 
obvious. But it more difficult to translate this framework to the digital health or 
medical software context, where it is often not the software itself, but the 
decision made as a result of using the software, that poses risk to the patient.152 
 
149. James M. Flaherty, Jr., Defending Substantial Equivalence: An Argument for the 
Continuing Validity of the 510(k) Premarket Notification Process, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 901, 902-03 
(2008); Shapiro, supra note 141, at 365-66. 
150. See, e.g., Statement from FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, M.D. and Jeff Shuren, M.D., 
Director of the Center for Devices and Radiological Health, on Transformative New Steps to Modernize 
FDA’s 510(k) Program to Advance the Review of the Safety and Effectiveness of Medical Devices (Nov. 
26, 2018), FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/
ucm626572.htm [https://perma.cc/8YZT-34LA]. 
151. 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (2018) (“[A]n instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, 
contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent, or other similar or related article, including any component, part, 
or accessory, which is . . . intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, 
mitigation, treatment or prevention of disease”). 
152. The difficulty of applying the risk-based medical device framework has also carried over 
to the context of diagnostic tests, where the FDA has faced similar regulatory challenges. See, e.g., 
Sachs, supra note 5, at 1896. 
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 As a result, the FDA has endeavored to exempt entire categories of 
medical software from its regulatory oversight. The FDA initially announced 
its intention to exercise its enforcement discretion for mobile health 
technologies that performed tasks like assisting patients in organizing their 
health information, coaching patients on strategies for maintaining healthy 
diets, or assisting providers in the performance of basic calculations, most of 
which had been previously performed without the aid of mobile health 
technologies.153  The FDA also offered an interpretation of the statute under 
which certain mobile health technologies would not be considered medical 
devices at all, such as those that provide access to electronic versions of hard-
copy medical textbooks, help train health care providers, or automate health 
care office operations.154 These interpretations were substantially codified in 
2016’s 21st Century Cures Act, which exempted these categories of software 
from the definition of “device,”155 unless the agency makes a finding that a 
specific software program would be “reasonably likely to have serious adverse 
health consequences.”156 
 Second, the FDA has recognized that it may be advantageous for patient 
care to permit medical software to update on a more rapid timescale than is 
standard for medical devices. Not only are product lifecycles in the software 
field typically much shorter than those in other contexts, including health 
care,157 but it would likely be beneficial to permit companies to fix previously 
undiscovered glitches or adverse events in a piece of code without obtaining 
permission beforehand from the FDA.158 The FDA has advanced a Digital 
Health Innovation Action Plan in the hopes of grappling with some of the 
challenges posed by medical software.159 The Plan includes some of the 
strategies articulated above, carving out certain medical software systems from 
the FDA’s jurisdiction. It also considers more novel regulatory approaches for 
this class of technologies. 
 
153. Mobile Medical Applications: Guidance for Industry and Food & Drug Administration 
Staff, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 15-18 (Feb. 2015). 
154. Id. at 20-22. 
155. 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 3060, 130 Stat. 1033, 1130 (2016) 
(codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360j (2018)). 
156. 21 U.S.C. § 360j(o)(3)(A)(i) (2018). 
157. Burk & Lemley, supra note 119, at 1622; Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent 
Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 39, 46 (2001). 
158. Digital Health Software Precertification Program, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (2018), 
https://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/digitalhealth/digitalhealthprecertprogram/default.htm 
[https://perma.cc/684T-WPM9] (“Because software products can be adapted to respond to glitches, 
adverse events, and other safety concerns quickly, the FDA is working to establish a regulatory 
framework that is equally responsive when issues arise to help ensure consumers continue to have 
access to safe and effective products.”). 
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 Perhaps most notably, the FDA is now piloting the Digital Health 
Software Precertification Program,160 which allows the agency to approve 
software developers, rather than software technologies, to speed the marketing 
and updating of a particular technology.161 Pre-certified firms may be able to 
market a lower-risk device without FDA approval or with a streamlined review 
process, and would be able to support evolving product functions as well. In 
September 2017, the FDA selected nine companies for inclusion in the pilot 
program.162 Although none have publicly been pre-certified yet, at least one—
Apple—has recently won approval under a different FDA pathway for Apple 
Watch apps that monitor a user’s heart rhythms to detect the presence of 
particular conditions.163 
 There are benefits and costs to both approaches. Perhaps most 
obviously, these programs make it easier for digital health companies to bring 
their products to market. To the extent that these technologies are beneficial for 
patient care, speeding their path to market enables those patients to reap the 
associated benefits sooner. These programs also assist the FDA in managing its 
scarce resources. Carving some technologies out of its jurisdiction or 
developing a policy of enforcement discretion enables the agency to focus on 
higher-risk technologies, while also providing companies with greater certainty 
about their regulatory obligations. 
 But there are potential costs to these approaches as well. First, because 
the point is for those technologies to iterate and improve with time, it is 
possible that earlier versions of the product might contain errors or fail to catch 
concerning symptoms, resulting in harm to patients. Second and relatedly, it is 
possible that consumers will not understand the difference between “FDA 
approval” and “FDA preclearance,” meaning that they will not be appropriately 
informed about the risks involved.164 Third, as Professor Nicolas Terry has 
 
160. Id. at 5-6; see also Digital Health Software Precertification Program, supra note 158. 
161. As of this writing, the Precertification Program applies only to software that is being used 
as a medical device, such as software that can analyze images to detect the presence or absence of a 
disease, rather than software in a medical device, such as software that is used to operate a pacemaker or 
infusion pump. Examples of Software as a Medical Device, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (2018), 
https://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/digitalhealth/softwareasamedicaldevice/ucm587924.htm 
[https://perma.cc/C6DJ-WCFT]. 
162. Digital Health Software Precertification Program, supra note 158. 
163. Letter from Angela Kruger, Food & Drug Admin. Ctr. for Devices & Radiological 
Health, to Donna-Bea Tillman, Biologics Consulting Grp. (Sept. 11, 2018), 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/pdf18/DEN180044.pdf [https://perma.cc/9QX4-QUYN] 
(noting that the request was for de novo review); see also Statement from FDA Commissioner Scott 
Gottlieb, M.D., and Center for Devices and Radiological Health Director Jeff Shuren, M.D., J.D., on 
Agency Efforts to Work with Tech Industry to Spur Innovation in Digital Health, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 
(Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/UCM620246.htm 
[https://perma.cc/UBM5-7F36] (describing the FDA’s efforts to use “more modern, flexible, and risk-
based approach[es] to regulation” for digital health products). 
164. See DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER 10-11 (2010) (emphasizing the trust 
patients put in the FDA and its consumer protection function); Joy Victory, What Did Journalists 
Overlook About the Apple Watch “Heart Monitor” Feature?, HEALTHNEWSREVIEW.ORG (Sept. 18, 
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argued, companies may engage in “regulatory arbitrage.”165 That is, digital 
health companies, seeing that only some technologies will be subject to more 
costly FDA approval,166 may design their technologies to avoid being subject to 
regulatory scrutiny.167 Regulatory arbitrage of this kind has at least two kinds 
of costs. First, some patients may be harmed by a technology that arguably 
should have been subject to FDA review.168 Second, some number of 
technologies will not be developed or will be developed with fewer features to 
avoid FDA scrutiny, and patients will miss out on the benefits of those 
undeveloped technologies. 
 There is an additional question about whether the precertification 
program is within the FDA’s existing statutory authority. Recently, Senators 
Patty Murray, Tina Smith, and Elizabeth Warren sent a letter to the FDA 
asking what statutory and regulatory authority the agency seeks to rely on not 
only in conducting the precertification pilot program but also in granting 
“preliminary” approval in the way that precertification envisions.169 Even if no 
company would be interested in or able to sue the FDA for what is essentially 
an exercise of enforcement discretion, congressional pressure might encourage 
the agency to slow or even abandon the program. 
 The FDA’s regulatory accommodations in the medical software field 
provide insight into the problem of intermediate technologies. As I argued in 
Section I.B supra, the FDA’s decision to exercise enforcement discretion over 
laboratory-developed tests may have enabled Myriad not only to launch but 
also to improve its genetic tests over time. But this enforcement discretion has 




165. Nicolas P. Terry, Regulatory Disruption and Arbitrage in Health care Data Protection, 
17 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 143 (2017); see also Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 
TEX. L. REV. 227, 230 (2010). 
166. FDA approval is a costly process, even if the type of scrutiny Apple underwent for its 
apps does not rise to the level of clinical trials required for a more invasive medical device. One survey 
of medical device companies found that Class III devices are typically far more expensive to develop 
than Class II devices. Josh Makower et al., FDA Impact on U.S. Medical Innovation 28 (Nov. 2010), 
http://eucomed.org/uploads/Press%20Releases/FDA%20impact%20on%20U.S.%20Medical%20
Technology%20Innovation.pdf (estimating the cost of developing a Class III device at $94 million, and 
a Class II device as $31 million). Other sources breaking these aggregate numbers down by stage of 
development confirm the survey’s rough estimates. See, e.g., Aaron V. Kaplan et al., Medical Device 
Development: From Prototype to Regulatory Approval, 109 Circulation 3068, 3069, 3072 (2004). 
167. See generally Terry, supra note 165 (discussing regulatory arbitrage in the health care 
context). 
168. Cf. The Public Health Evidence for FDA Oversight of Laboratory Developed Tests: 20 
Case Studies, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Nov. 2015), http://wayback.archive-
it.org/7993/20171115144712/https://www.fda.gov/downloads/
AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports/UCM472777.pdf [https://perma.cc/4FQC-Y29Z] (detailing 
consumer harms from laboratory-developed tests, which are essentially unregulated by the FDA). 
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precertification—in which the manufacturer is identified and managed but 
rapid updates are permitted—might be appropriate as well. Similarly, a system 
of precertification might have relevance in the manufacturing context, as the 
idea of permitting a single company or manufacturer to undergo one oversight 
review for updating their manufacturing systems for multiple drugs could be 
considered. 
C. Adaptive Regulation Models 
 Outside the context of health care regulation, regulatory structures that 
account for temporal technological development of the kind considered in this 
Article feature prominently in environmental law and legal scholarship.170 
Environmental law has made use of adaptive management and regulatory 
strategies to help enable environmental regulations to iterate in the face of new 
information or changing conditions. Although there are key differences 
between environmental regulation and the health care technologies context, the 
focus on administrative flexibility in the face of uncertainty about both factual 
situations and changing technology provides a helpful perspective from which 
to view the problem of intermediate technologies. 
 Adaptive management differs from the traditional model of 
administrative rulemaking, in which agencies devote resources on the front end 
to developing a particular regulatory structure and then observe how that 
structure plays out. In adaptive management, agencies instead “engage in a 
program of iterative decision-making following a structured, multistep 
protocol.”171 They may use a range of regulatory strategies to engage in this 
iterative process. For instance, they might provide for periodic opportunities to 
revisit existing rules,172 include procedures for agency reconsideration as new 
information is developed,173 or even provide for regulations to update 
automatically as events occur.174 More generally, scholars have argued that 
adaptive regulation may be particularly useful where there is high uncertainty, 
 
170. Adaptive management systems have been applied in other contexts, such as financial 
regulation. See Charles K. Whitehead, The Goldilocks Approach: Financial Risk and Staged Regulation, 
97 CORNELL L. REV. 1267, 1302-04 (2012); see also Justin R. Pidot, Governance and Uncertainty, 37 
CARDOZO L. REV. 113, 127-29 (2015) (describing financial regulation under conditions of uncertainty). 
171. Robin Kundis Craig & J.B. Ruhl, Designing Administrative Law for Adaptive 
Management, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1, 7 (2014). 
172. Pidot, supra note 170, at 142-45 (2015); see also Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary 
Legislation, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 247, 247 (2007) (describing “temporary legislation” that limits its own 
duration); Zachary J. Gubler, Experimental Rules, 55 B.C. L. REV. 129, 130 (2014) (describing 
“reversible” rules that allow for reconsideration with additional information). 
173. Pidot, supra note 170, at 151-56. 
174. Id. at 164-65. 
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the agency has considerable control over its decisions, and the risk resulting 
from a potential regulatory error is low.175 
 In some ways, the ideas of adaptive regulation may seem to be a poor fit 
for the health care technologies context. First, adaptive management developed 
in the context of agencies engaging in notice-and-comment rulemaking, 
governed by the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, in an attempt 
to give agencies greater ability to oversee complex, evolving situations.176 
Although the FDA and CMS can and often do engage in substantive 
rulemaking,177 their core functions at issue in this Article—the approval of and 
reimbursement for new health care technologies—take place at some removal 
from the formulation of those approval standards in the first instance. Second, a 
core goal of adaptive management is to enable laws and regulations to change, 
and only sometimes is that in response to changes in technologies (sometimes it 
is a response to the development of new information, which is a distinct 
concern). By contrast, my focus here is on appropriate regulatory structures to 
employ in the context of evolving technology, a question which may or may 
not involve legal structures that themselves change. 
 But in other ways, the FDA and CMS (if not the PTO)178 have in fact 
developed regulatory strategies that differ for different technologies, depending 
on factors like the risks those technologies pose or the potential social value 
they provide. As noted in the previous Section, the FDA has chosen to develop 
novel regulatory approaches for digital health technologies. The FDA also 
employs a range of expedited approval programs, whose purpose is to 
abbreviate the regulatory review process for companies seeking approval for 
pharmaceuticals which treat serious conditions and which may represent a 
significant benefit relative to the current standard of care.179 For instance, the 
 
175. Craig R. Allen & Lance H. Gunderson, Pathology and Failure in the Design and 
Implementation of Adaptive Management, 92 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 1379, 1380, 1383 (2011); Craig & Ruhl, 
supra note 171, at 19-20. 
176. Craig & Ruhl, supra note 171, at 4-5. 
177. The PTO lacks substantive rulemaking authority. Michael J. Burstein, Rules for Patents, 
52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1747, 1755 (2011). 
178. Patent law on its face is largely technology-neutral, but non-PTO actors, including both 
the Federal Circuit and other administrative agencies, may interpret patent statutes in ways that permit 
the law to be applied differently within different fields of technology. See generally, e.g., Burk & 
Lemley, supra note 119; see also Tejas N. Narechania, Patent Conflicts, 103 GEO. L.J. 1483, 1488 
(2015) (arguing that non-PTO administrative agencies can provide expertise with industry-specific 
patent tailoring); Arti K. Rai, Building a Better Innovation System: Combining Facially Neutral Patent 
Standards with Therapeutics Regulation, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1037 (2008). 
179. For an overview and comparison of the FDA’s four programs in this area, see Guidance 
for Industry: Expedited Programs for Serious Conditions—Drugs and Biologics, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 
7-8 (May 2014), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/
guidances/ucm358301.pdf [https://perma.cc/3HDS-WNGU] [hereinafter Expedited Programs 
Guidance]. The substance of the latter criterion is phrased slightly differently within each program. See, 
e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 356(a)(1) (2018) (breakthrough therapy designation is triggered upon a showing of 
“substantial improvement over existing therapies”); id. § 356(b)(1) (fast track designation is triggered 
upon a showing of “potential to address unmet medical needs”); 21 C.F.R. § 314.500 (2019) 
(accelerated approval is triggered upon a showing of “meaningful therapeutic benefit . . . over available 
therapies”); Expedited Programs Guidance, supra, at 24 (priority review is triggered when a drug would 
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accelerated approval program permits the FDA to approve a new drug on the 
basis of a surrogate endpoint, rather than a true clinical endpoint,180 shortening 
the clinical trial process.181 For rare diseases, and especially for rare cancers, 
products are increasingly approved on the basis of a single-arm trial, in which 
the potential drug in question is not tested against any other intervention, 
whether placebo or active comparator.182 
 In theory, many of these new regulatory approaches come with a 
temporal aspect. The accelerated approval program typically requires 
companies to engage in confirmatory trials postapproval to ensure that the 
benefit observed in the context of a surrogate endpoint translates to the clinical 
context.183 Such products also may be subject to expedited withdrawal 
protocols.184 These additional requirements resemble the kinds of policy levers 
identified in the adaptive management literature, providing opportunities for 
reconsideration of an agency’s initial decision.185 However, it is common for 
companies to fail to complete these clinical trials,186 depriving the public of 
information about the true clinical value of these expedited therapies. And even 
though failure to complete these trials may trigger the FDA’s expedited 
withdrawal authority, the FDA essentially never uses that authority.187 In 
 
provide a “significant improvement in safety or effectiveness” relative to current therapies). However, 
they are phrased similarly enough that drugs will often qualify for multiple programs. Breakthrough 
Therapy Designation: Exploring the Qualifying Criteria, BROOKINGS CTR. FOR HEALTH POL’Y 3 
(2015), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Breakthrough-Therapy-
Designation_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/XJU4-9PUF]. 
180. 21 U.S.C. § 356(c)(1)(A). A surrogate endpoint is a “laboratory measurement or a 
physical sign used as a substitute for a clinically meaningful endpoint that measures directly how a 
patient feels, functions, or survives.” Robert J. Temple, A Regulatory Authority’s Opinion About 
Surrogate Endpoints, in CLINICAL MEASUREMENT IN DRUG EVALUATION 3, 4 (Walter Nimmo & 
Geoffrey Tucker eds., 1995); see also 21 C.F.R. § 314.500. A new drug may be evaluated based on its 
ability to lower a patient’s level of cholesterol, a surrogate endpoint, rather than on its ability to decrease 
the patient’s risk of death from heart disease, the relevant clinical endpoint. Katalin Bognar et al., The 
Role of Imperfect Surrogate Endpoint Information in Drug Approval and Reimbursement Decisions, 51 
J. HEALTH ECON. 1, 2 (2017). 
181. Thomas R. Fleming, Surrogate Endpoints and FDA’s Accelerated Approval Process, 24 
HEALTH AFF. 67, 67 (2005). 
182. See, e.g., Himabindu Gaddipati et al., Rare Cancer Trial Design: Lessons from FDA 
Approvals, 18 CLINICAL CANCER RES. 5172, 5176 (2012). 
183. Huseyin Naci et al., Characteristics of Preapproval and Postapproval Studies for Drugs 
Granted Accelerated Approval by the US Food and Drug Administration, 318 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 626, 
627 (2017); Expedited Programs Guidance, supra note 179, at 15. 
184. Expedited Programs Guidance, supra note 179, at 8, 23-24. 
185. See Craig & Ruhl, supra note 171, at 20-21 (noting that certain FDA approval questions 
fit the adaptive management paradigm well). 
186. Naci et al., supra note 183, at 634 (noting that of twenty-four indications approved under 
the Accelerated Approval program, eight indications still had not fulfilled their postmarket requirements 
five years after approval). 
187. The most cited case in which the FDA did use this authority is its revocation of 
accelerated approval of the drug Avastin for its use in patients with particular forms of breast cancer. 
See Andrew Pollack, F.D.A. Revokes Approval of Avastin for Use as Breast Cancer Drug, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 18, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/19/business/fda-revokes-approval-of-avastin-as-
breast-cancer-drug.html [https://perma.cc/74S5-JX9U]. FDA officials argued that Avastin not only was 
not helpful for these patients, but also that it came with a risk of potentially serious side effects. See id. 
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thinking about how adaptive management might be extended to the health care 
regulatory space, then, considering policy levers that will spring into being 
unless the FDA takes affirmative action in the opposite direction might be 
beneficial. 
D. Reimbursement Policy 
Each of the three previously discussed areas of law is explicitly, 
consciously focused on temporal regulation and technological improvement. 
The design of reimbursement policy, by contrast, has almost wholly ignored 
not only intermediate technologies but also innovation in general.188 Yet CMS 
possesses a strong ability to influence the development of intermediate 
technologies in its capacity as the provider of health insurance for over 100 
million Americans.189 In that role, CMS makes choices about not only what 
health care products to purchase for those two programs but also how much it 
will pay for them.190 These choices provide CMS with the ability to influence 
the types of technologies that are developed,191 even if CMS is often not acting 
explicitly (and is definitely not acting only) as an innovation-promoting 
agency. 
Even if CMS in general is focused on health care access rather than health 
care innovation, two particular aspects of  CMS’ reimbursement policy evince 
an awareness of temporal regulation and technological development. The first 
is the New Technology Add-on Payment (NTAP) system. The NTAP program 
arose when policymakers became concerned that Medicare’s existing system 
for reimbursing hospital services was not adequately rewarding either the 
development of new technologies or their dissemination into standard medical 
practice. The program allows CMS to identify new medical technologies and 
 
The contentious nature of this decision and the anger directed at the agency as a result is likely to be 
typical of any such decision. This is true even though the drug remained on the market due to its 
approval for other indications. Kurt R. Karst, FDA Withdraws Avastin Breast Cancer Indication 
Approval, FDA L. BLOG (Nov. 22, 2011), http://www.fdalawblog.net/2011/11/fda-withdraws-avastin-
breast-cancer-indication-approval [https://perma.cc/G8UX-Q255]. 
188. See Sachs, supra note 14. 
189. See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Fiscal Year 2016: Justification of Estimates 
for Appropriations Committees, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. 109-10 (2015) [hereinafter FY 2016: 
Justification of Estimates], https://www.cms.gov/About-CMS/Agency-Information/PerformanceBudget/
Downloads/FY2016-CJ-Final.pdf. 
190. See Sachs, supra note 8, at 2011. 
191. See William Fisher, Intellectual Property and Innovation: Theoretical, Empirical, and 
Historical Perspectives, in 37 INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, INNOVATION, AND THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED 
ECONOMY, BELEIDSSTUDIES TECHNOLOGIE ECONOMIE 12 (2001), https://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/
tfisher/Innovation.pdf [https://perma.cc/WVB7-3879]; Kevin Outterson, The Legal Ecology of 
Resistance: The Role of Antibiotic Resistance in Pharmaceutical Innovation, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 613, 
645-55 (2010); Arti K. Rai, The Ends of Intellectual Property: Health as a Case Study, 70 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 128-29 (2007); Roin, supra note 13, at 1013; Sachs, supra note 14, at 178, 193. 
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offer providers sufficient reimbursement for using them.192  The program has 
notably been used where new technologies challenge the traditional 
reimbursement paradigm. CMS recently used the program for two new cancer 
immunotherapy products that presented reimbursement difficulties, pending 
development of new billing arrangements for those products.193 
The second reimbursement lever which is tied to the developmental state 
of a technology is the Coverage with Evidence Development (CED) model. 
CED allows CMS to provide time-limited reimbursement for a health care 
technology while its manufacturer completes the relevant clinical trials to 
produce information that will be needed for a more fully informed coverage 
determination.194 In some ways, it can be thought of as related to the FDA’s 
accelerated approval system. Where existing data are not sufficient for 
regulators to determine whether and how much a new health care technology 
might benefit the Medicare population, but where there is a strong possibility 
of such benefit, the agency may make the new technology available to patients 
now and reserve a fuller judgment as information is gathered over time. 
Professor Becky Eisenberg and former NIH director Harold Varmus have 
recently argued for CED’s use in the context of one intermediate technology: 
next-generation sequencing in oncology.195 
Both the NTAP and CED models give due consideration to the 
developmental stage of a particular healthcare technology. However, neither 
focuses on technological development as its primary goal. Both models are 
largely aimed at providing patients with access to these new technologies, 
rather than providing researchers with incentives to develop them. As such, 
Part III considers ways in which these models might be reframed to place 
innovation at the forefront of CMS’ agenda. 
III. Promoting Innovation in Intermediate Technologies 
If existing regulations often threaten to ossify health care technologies at 
an earlier stage of development than might be socially valuable, how might 
agencies (perhaps with assistance from Congress) begin to address these 
concerns? As discussed in Part II supra, templates for possible solutions may 
be found in existing FDA regulations and in adaptive management techniques. 
But others may be imagined as well. This Part first attempts to articulate a 
 
192. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(K) (2018); see also Alexandra T. Clyde et al., Experience 
with Medicare’s New Technology Add-on Payment Program, 27 HEALTH AFF. 1632, 1633 (2008) 
(detailing the history and mechanics of the New Technology Add-on Payment Program). 
193. Alicia Gallegos, CMS Finalizes CAR-T Cell Therapy Inpatient Payments, MDEDGE 
(Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.mdedge.com/oncologypractice/article/173086/practice-management/cms-
finalizes-car-t-cell-therapy-inpatient [https://perma.cc/D59Y-P2VY]. 
194. LIZ RICHARDSON, HEALTH AFFAIRS, HEALTH POLICY BRIEF: ALIGNING FDA AND CMS 
REVIEW 2-3 (2015). 
195. Rebecca Eisenberg & Harold Varmus, Insurance for Broad Genomic Tests in Oncology, 
358 SCI. 1133, 1134 (2017). 
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more generalized statement of the problem that informs my approach to 
identifying solutions and considers whether solutions can be identified at a high 
level of generality or must be envisioned in response to specific technological 
problems. It goes on to identify solutions that sound in both FDA regulation 
and in reimbursement policy, as those may better resolve the problems 
identified for intermediate technologies. 
A. Generalizing Both the Problem and Potential Solutions 
 Attempting to articulate a general theory of when intermediate 
technologies can be expected to occur has at least two key benefits. First, as 
previously discussed, it is difficult, if not impossible, to forecast the paths that 
development may take in the life sciences, and identifying only a subset of 
potential intermediate technologies would leave other technologies without 
regulatory solutions. In other words, being able to predict rather than engage in 
somewhat post-hoc identification of intermediate technologies would be ideal. 
Second, for resource-limited administrative agencies, identifying specific 
problems (let alone specific solutions) requires time and capacity they may not 
readily possess. Being able to generalize the problem could address both of 
these concerns. 
The problem of improving intermediate technologies in some ways196 
generalizes very easily to resemble other innovation-related problems in the life 
sciences. In the abstract, life-sciences technology companies must often invest 
significant resources (financially, in time, or otherwise) in developing new 
products and bringing them to market.197 However, they are unlikely to make 
these investments unless they foresee that they will be able to earn sufficient 
returns on that investment to enable them to recoup their costs.198 Legal tools 
operate on both sides of this equation—the investment of resources and the 
return on investment—to influence companies’ decision-making. 
 For instance, sometimes companies would be required to invest a much 
larger amount than is typical on the front end to bring a product to market. 
Perhaps this is because the science is particularly difficult, as in the case of 
Alzheimer’s disease, or perhaps it is because the regulatory approval process 
for a class of drugs is particularly long.199 In these types of cases, scholars talk 
 
196. In other ways, the problem generalizes quite poorly. It is not a matter of identifying 
particular legal levers (patents, FDA regulation, and health insurance reimbursement) and considering 
whether those levers are turned “on” or “off” in any particular case. The examples articulated here and 
others follow no clear pattern along these lines. 
197. See MAKOWER, supra note 166, at 28 (estimating the cost of developing a Class III 
device at $94 million, and a Class II device as $31 million); Joseph A. DiMasi et al., Innovation in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry: New Estimates of R&D Costs, 47 J. HEALTH ECON. 20, 20 (2016) (estimating 
preapproval costs for new pharmaceuticals to be $2.558 billion). 
198. I mean this in a broad sense. In the pharmaceutical industry, the cost of failures may be 
more salient than in the mobile health space, for instance. 
199. Budish, Roin & Williams, supra note 10. 
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about “push” mechanisms to promote innovation.200 They might consider 
grants,201 R&D tax credits,202 or lowering FDA barriers to approval.203 More 
generally, these are investments that pay for inputs or otherwise reduce the cost 
of R&D. 
Sometimes, though, the problem is on the other end. If companies can see 
that there is an insufficient paying market for a product, they may be reluctant 
to proceed through development. Exclusive rights (either patents or FDA-
administered exclusivity periods) are the classic tool for encouraging 
companies who may question whether they can obtain a return on their 
investment. More broadly, scholars refer to more creative “pull” 
mechanisms.204 Pull mechanisms include advance market commitments, where 
foundations or governments commit to purchase specified quantities of a 
particular product if it is developed;205 prizes, where governments offer payouts 
for the development of new products;206 or prescription drug reimbursement, 
which performs a similar function to a prize system.207 
This generalized statement of potential innovation-related problems 
applies not only to the initial development of a particular product but also to 
subsequent, iterative decisions about the improvement of that product. If a 
pharmaceutical company predicts that it must invest more money to improve its 
manufacturing process than it will be able to earn as a result, it is unlikely to 
make those improvements. However, this might be true for multiple, 
overlapping reasons. On the front end, it could be that the science of 
continuous manufacturing is challenging and that FDA approval of the new 
manufacturing process is a risky proposition. On the back end, it could be that 
patents are likely unenforceable for these technologies and that reimbursement 
will not increase to account for the improvements. It may be all of the above. 
There is no single reason or set of regulatory structures that causes a 
technology to stagnate at an intermediate stage. Instead, the problem is similar 
in nature (although not in effect) to other types of innovation-related problems. 
Stating the problem at this level of generality helps to appreciate potential 
solutions at this level as well. Where intermediate technologies face both front-
end problems (like risky FDA approval processes) and back-end problems (like 
stagnating reimbursement levels), both push and pull mechanisms can be 
deployed as potential solutions. Relatedly, though, these “carrots”—whether in 
 
200. Michael Kremer, Pharmaceuticals and the Developing World, 16 J. ECON. PERSP. 67, 82 
(2002). 
201. Price, supra note 11. 
202. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 12, at 306. 
203. Breakthrough Therapy Designation, supra note 179, at 3. 
204. Kremer, supra note 200, at 82. See generally MICHAEL KREMER & RACHEL 
GLENNERSTER, STRONG MEDICINE (2004). 
205. Kremer, supra note 200, at 75. 
206. See Roin, supra note 13. 
207. Sachs, supra note 14, at 178 (arguing that “prescription drug insurance strongly 
resembles a prize system”). 
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the form of mitigating regulatory hurdles on the front end208 or providing 
additional incentives on the back end—ought to be considered alongside 
innovation “sticks,” which penalize the failure to innovate.209 For a number of 
the carrots I identify below, I identify accompanying sticks that might 
complement the carrot in a way that increases the likelihood of technological 
development while minimizing some of the costs of the proposal.210 
 One additional question is whether the solutions I identify here are 
specific to a particular technological example or are more general. Ideally, the 
solutions as well as the problem would be stated at a reasonably high level of 
generality because identifying specific solutions to specific problems requires 
work to identify those specific problems as well as work to identify and 
implement specific solutions. For resource-limited agencies, identifying 
common problems within a technological class and proposing solutions at that 
level will prove useful. However, this may not be achievable in all cases, and 
the level of generality may vary by example (as I consider infra). 
 At the same time, though, there may be reasons beyond agency 
resources to encourage more narrowly tailored solutions. These solutions have 
costs, as well as benefits. On balance, the benefits might be “worth” the costs 
in a situation of intermediate technologies, where otherwise the technology in 
question would not be developed fully. But an agency applying solutions 
broadly might reasonably be concerned about incurring the costs for 
technologies which do not face these same challenges of intermediacy.211 As 
such, more risk-averse actors might prefer narrowly tailored solutions, even if 
they require more work to identify and implement on the front end. 
 Below, I consider one category of push mechanisms that might be 
implemented by the FDA and one category of pull mechanisms that might be 
implemented by actors within the reimbursement system. This is not because 
they are the only institutional actors with the ability to solve the problem in the 
sense of intervening on either side of the balance, but they may well have 
superior resources or capacities to do so. 
For instance, even though patent law has developed several doctrines 
which fit closely with the problem of intermediate technologies,212 in many 
ways the patent system and the PTO in particular are not well-suited for 
 
208. Unlike much of the literature on innovation policy, which seeks to identify additional 
incentives (or bolster existing incentives) that might be used to promote innovation into health care 
technologies, my goal here is to mitigate the existing regulatory hurdles. Of course, it is highly likely 
that a mix of both strategies—addressing regulatory hurdles and providing innovation incentives—will 
be useful, but the existing literature on the latter is far more robust as compared to the former. 
209. Ian Ayres & Amy Kapczynski, Innovation Sticks: The Limited Case for Penalizing 
Failures to Innovate, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1781, 1783 (2015). 
210. See id. at 1811 (“[P]olicymakers can deploy carrots and sticks . . . together and may often 
wish to do so.”). 
211. See supra text accompanying notes 120-21 for a discussion about whether all 
technologies in this space are intermediate in some meaningful sense. 
212. See supra Section II.A. 
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solving problems that are unique to particular subject matters. Chiefly, this is 
because of the facial uniformity of the patent statute.213 Patent doctrine is 
formally one-size-fits-all,214 even though pharmaceuticals and software may 
not be in need of the same length and breadth of patent protection, given the 
drastically different product lifecycles in the two fields.215 Even within health 
care technologies, diagnostics, devices, and drugs may be in need of more 
finely tailored innovation incentives, given the very different paths each class 
of products takes to market. Policymakers have already created highly specific 
innovation incentives in the life sciences, including exclusivity periods, grants, 
tax credits, and reimbursement models—just not within the patent system. 
Further, the PTO lacks the ability possessed by other administrative 
agencies to engage in substantive-rulemaking and to administer innovation-
related programs like those I articulate below.216 The PTO’s lack of substantive 
rulemaking authority217 means that it could not engage in tailoring of the kind 
that would be needed for intermediate technologies, even if it had the 
inclination to do so. At present, in part because of this lack of authority, the 
PTO also has little expertise in administering technology-specific incentives of 
this type. The creation of the PTO’s Office of the Chief Economist218 may help 
address this question. But as of now, the PTO is at a disadvantage when 
compared with other agencies that constantly make decisions about how to 
allocate scarce innovation resources.219 
I am not claiming that patent law in principle is incapable of responding to 
these concerns, or that patents are not an important lever for health-related 
technologies (although they may be far less important, or even unimportant, in 
medical algorithmic technologies as compared to the pharmaceutical context). 
Instead, it may be that the institutional capacities currently possessed by the 
relevant actors within the patent system were simply not created to allow the 
agency to engage in this kind of problem-solving. 
B. Leveraging the FDA to Encourage the Development of Information 
 As Professor Rebecca Eisenberg has argued, one of the central 
functions of the FDA is to shape the development of information about new 
 
213. Sachs, supra note 8, at 1994-95. Of course, as scholars have argued, in practice the 
doctrine is often tailored to particular fields of technology. See supra note 178. 
214. See Michael W. Carroll, One Size Does Not Fit All: A Framework for Tailoring 
Intellectual Property Rights, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361, 1363-64 (2009) (questioning patent and copyright 
law’s grants of “one-size-fits-all” bundles of rights). 
215. Cohen & Lemley, supra note 157, at 39, 46. 
216. Sachs, supra note 8, at 1995. 
217. Michael J. Burstein, Rules for Patents, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1747, 1755 (2011). 
218. Robert P. Merges, Kappos Legacy and PTO-Academia Relations, IPWATCHDOG (July 
28, 2014), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/07/28/kappos-legacy-and-pto-academia-relations 
[https://perma.cc/FRH3-YXLS]. 
219. See Sachs, supra note 8, at 1994-96, for a fuller discussion of patent law’s core 
competencies relative to those of other fields of law. 
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health care technologies.220 The FDA’s ability to require drug and device 
sponsors to produce information about the safety and efficacy of their products, 
information they would be unlikely to produce without the FDA’s 
involvement,221 is key to promoting innovation in the intermediate-
technologies context. But the challenge is to make sure that information is not 
just developed but also used and implemented in a way that is beneficial for 
patient care and safety. Incentives to promote the development and use of such 
information are likely to differ across health care technologies. Here, I consider 
one potential taxonomy to distinguish between the types of intermediate 
technologies I identify in Part I, articulating ways in which regulatory burdens 
might be lessened while remaining attentive to safety and efficacy concerns. 
1. Improvement of Existing Technologies 
The example of Myriad and laboratory-developed tests may be the 
cleanest example of an intermediate technology. At the time Myriad’s test was 
marketed, it was beneficial to more than half of the women receiving the test. 
But for a large minority of women, Myriad’s test failed to give them the 
information they needed about their breast cancer risk.222 Ideally, all genetic 
testing companies would seek to both market their test at the time it provides 
meaningful clinical benefits for the majority of patients, and to strive to 
improve it over time to benefit a greater and greater percentage of patients. In 
short, we want diagnostic testing companies to engage in iterative improvement 
as Myriad did. 
 Myriad was able to carry out this business strategy due to the favorable 
regulatory climate. Myriad had patents to protect its monopoly position, and it 
did not need to obtain FDA approval for its test.223 But the regulatory 
environment has changed. Myriad’s key gene patents were invalidated in the 
Supreme Court on the grounds that they did not claim patent-eligible subject 
matter,224 and cases in both the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit invalidating 
diagnostic-testing patents on these same grounds225 suggest that it will be 
nearly impossible for companies to obtain patents on genetic tests going 
forward.226 Reimbursement may also be threatened, given Congress’s reform of 
 
220. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. 
& TECH. L. REV. 345, 348 (2007). 
221. Kapczynski & Syed, supra note 16, at 1922. 
222. Eggington, supra note 54. 
223. Although Myriad was subject to regulation through both CMS and the State of New 
York, those regulatory structures are not as rigorous as the regulations the FDA had previously proposed 
through draft guidance. Sachs, supra note 5, at 1893-94. 
224. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 591 (2013). 
225. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71-72 (2012); Ariosa 
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 809 F.3d 1282, 1288-89 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
226. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Diagnostics Need Not Apply, 21 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 
256, 257 (2015); John M. Golden, Flook Says One Thing, Diehr Says Another: A Need for 
Housecleaning in the Law of Patentable Subject Matter, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1765, 1791-92 (2014). 
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diagnostic testing reimbursements in the Protecting Access to Medicare Act of 
2014.227 At the same time, the FDA may be moving toward increased agency 
scrutiny of laboratory-developed tests (LDTs).228 
 When these three legal developments are combined—removing patents, 
decreasing potential reimbursement, and increasing regulatory requirements—
the incentive situation today for diagnostic tests companies wanting to enter the 
market may be far more difficult than it was for Myriad. As a result, the FDA 
might consider a temporally adjusted regulatory system, in which the burden of 
initial approval is somewhat less than is typical for a medical device of similar 
risk, but in which continuous improvement is not just expected but required. 
 The FDA might employ a number of strategies to carry out this 
regulatory goal. For example, the FDA might consider extending a program 
akin to the precertification pilot being used in the mobile-health context. That 
is, the FDA might certify testing companies, rather than the tests themselves. 
Alternatively, the FDA might adapt the temporal strategy used for drugs 
receiving an accelerated-approval designation and require additional reporting 
(perhaps on an annual basis) about the quality of the information being 
provided by the diagnostic-testing firm, as an accompanying stick. A failure to 
disclose publicly this information—or, more controversially, a failure to 
improve rapidly enough—would lead to label restrictions or a withdrawal from 
the market.229 
 Importantly, these proposals do not address one of the core difficulties 
with Myriad’s business model: concerns over access and pricing, as noted in 
Part I. Now that patents have become unavailable for most of these 
technologies, it is possible that these access concerns will be unlikely to recur 
in the future. However, it is conceivable that companies will be able to obtain 
favorable market positions, if they are able to accrete sufficient amounts of data 
to establish an initial head start over potential competitors, or use proprietary 
algorithms that are protected through trade secrecy.230 
 A proposal that would both lower barriers to entry for these companies 
and address some of these access concerns would likely require institutions 
beyond the FDA. The use of a federal database of potentially pathogenic 
mutations for particular conditions—coupled with the requirement (enforced by 
 
Although this may change in light of some more recent cases and guidance from the PTO, see Vanda 
Pharm. Inc. v. W.-Ward Pharm. Int’l Ltd., 887 F.3d 1117, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2018), it is too early to tell 
what impact those developments will have. 
227. Sachs, supra note 5, at 1923. 
228. The FDA has repeatedly attempted to regulate LDTs, and previous attempts have failed. 
See supra note 58 for an explanation of these attempts. 
229. For a similar proposal conditioning a benefit upon fuller public disclosure of clinical trial 
information, although in the context of pharmaceuticals, see generally Daniel J. Gervais, The Patent 
Option, 20 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 357 (2019). 
230. For instance, these algorithms are often held by companies exploring more complex 
genomic questions. See, e.g., Illumina Acquires Edico Genome to Accelerate Genomic Data Analysis, 
ILLUMINA (May 15, 2018), http://investor.illumina.com/
mobile.view?c=121127&v=203&d=1&id=2349147 [https://perma.cc/7584-6B65]. 
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the FDA) that companies seeking to market genetic tests for these conditions 
contribute their knowledge to these databases—would democratize access to 
the relevant information by potential competitors. The FDA might expand its 
partnership with the NIH,231 which already maintains several such databases,232 
to begin aggregating the relevant information. 
2. Expansion of Existing Technologies 
The example of the microbiome context presents somewhat different 
considerations than does the genetic testing example. Rather than focusing on a 
single technology and its improvement, the microbiome example focuses more 
closely on developing information about new uses for existing technologies. 
This problem has been discussed in the literature, with scholars advancing 
proposals that would encourage different actors to identify potential new uses 
for existing drugs.233 The difference in the microbiome context is one of 
foreseeability. 
The essential problem is as follows: approving a drug for one indication 
enables physicians to prescribe that drug off-label for other conditions for 
which it has not been approved. Companies will often not pursue FDA 
approval for those additional indications, in part because of the potential risk 
that the required clinical trials will fail to demonstrate efficacy for the new 
indications.234 In some cases, these drugs will be safe and effective for their 
additional indications, but in others they will not, exposing patients to 
unnecessary risks and costs along the way. The FDA might prefer for these 
companies to proceed through the standard approval process for additional 
indications, but the FDA typically cannot require them to do so.235 Further, the 
FDA usually does not have a choice about how to regulate standard 
prescription drugs, in the sense that the standard pharmaceutical-approval 
pathway permits this set of incentives to occur. 
 
231. Sachs, supra note 8, at 2031; FDA Takes New Action to Advance the Development of 
Reliable and Beneficial Genetic Tests that Can Improve Patient Care, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Dec. 4, 
2018), https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm627555.htm 
[https://perma.cc/MX8Z-MSVM]. 
232. See, e.g., ClinVar, NAT’L CTR. FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY INFO. (2018), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/clinvar [https://perma.cc/9LUT-EJMM] (“ClinVar aggregates 
information about genomic variation and its relationship to human health”); Human Gene Mutation 
Database Professional, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH (2018), https://www.nihlibrary.nih.gov/resources/
tools/human-gene-mutation-database-professional [https://perma.cc/QS5J-F5NF]. 
233. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg & W. Nicholson Price II, Promoting Health care Innovation 
on the Demand Side, 4 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 3, 5-6 (2017); Sachs, Ginsburg, & Goldman, supra note 
116, at 2421. 
234. See Kapczynski & Syed, supra note 16, at 1923. 
235. One class of exceptions would be in cases involving products subject to Risk Evaluation 
and Mitigation Strategies, where their prescription is constrained by law. See, e.g., Jordan Paradise, 
REMS as a Competitive Tactic: Is Big Pharma Hijacking Drug Access and Patient Safety?, 15 HOUS. J. 
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 43, 57-62 (2015). 
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But in the microbiome context, the FDA had a choice. At the time it was 
deciding how to regulate microbiome-based technologies, the FDA was likely 
aware that scientists were investigating the microbiome’s applications to a 
range of conditions. As a result, it should have understood that choosing to 
adopt the standard pharmaceutical-regulatory pathway for microbiome-based 
technologies would constrain its ability to regulate follow-on uses of these 
technologies. Instead, the FDA could have adopted a use-based regulatory 
paradigm, akin to the one employed in the context of human cellular products 
like cord blood. That paradigm would have allowed it to regulate each potential 
use of these microbiome-based technologies as they are raised, forcing 
companies to produce the relevant information about potential additional 
uses.236 
It is possible that the FDA may reevaluate its choice of regulatory 
paradigm237 and address this concern. But more generally, we can look to the 
literature on adaptive management for potential solutions to both this problem 
and the problem of new uses for old drugs. Out of concern for both patient 
safety and unnecessary medical spending on pharmaceuticals of questionable 
value, Congress might give the FDA additional authority to force 
pharmaceutical companies to conduct clinical trials on new uses for their 
existing drugs. This authority could be triggered under a range of imagined 
circumstances, and penalties might include imposing a risk-based prescription 
limitation on the drug in question238 or significant fines. 
In the context of the microbiome and other pharmaceuticals, the problem 
of intermediate technologies is primarily one of encouraging the production of 
information. Companies can but do not have to produce such information to 
enjoy sales of their products for off-label uses, so they often choose not to. To 
lower hurdles to information production, another strategy that could be adopted 
would be to lessen the regulatory burden on companies seeking approval for 
additional uses of their products, in the hope that lessening that burden 
encourages more of them to seek additional approvals. To some extent, 
Congress has approved this strategy, providing for the FDA to consider the use 
of “real-world evidence” in obtaining supplemental approvals in the 21st 
Century Cures Act.239 But it may be that allowing companies to use such 
 
236. Sachs & Edelstein, supra note 110, at 409-12. 
237. The FDA has recently convened a meeting on this topic. See Statement from FDA 
Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, M.D., on Advancing the Science and Regulation of Live Microbiome-
Based Products Used to Prevent, Treat, or Cure Diseases in Humans, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Aug. 16, 
2018), https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm617168.htm 
[https://perma.cc/Z5JM-YQ5H]. 
238. The FDA might leverage its existing REMS authority for this purpose. 
239. 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 3022, 130 Stat. 1033, 1096 (2016) 
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evidence lowers the FDA’s reviewing bar too much.240 If so, solutions that 
increase and mandate, rather than lessen, the relevant regulatory burden may be 
necessary. 
3. Process Improvements into Existing Technologies 
The pharmaceutical-manufacturing context presents yet another set of 
considerations for the FDA. The goal is both to encourage companies to shift 
older products to a new manufacturing paradigm, and to introduce new 
products using that paradigm. The concern in this case seems to be a 
combination of hurdles in both innovation and regulation. Even though it might 
be advantageous for companies to shift from batch to continuous 
manufacturing, companies investing in such efforts may find it difficult to 
exclude competitors from free-riding on their investments, and the risk and 
time of FDA approval for the new manufacturing process render it unattractive 
to firms. 
The FDA has already taken admirable steps to reduce each of these 
barriers. As noted above, the FDA is now authorized to award grants “for the 
purpose of studying and recommending improvements to the process of 
continuous manufacturing of drugs and biological products.”241 Further, the 
FDA’s repeated public statements in support of shifting to novel manufacturing 
methods242 and public praise of the few companies who have chosen to use 
these methods243 may be an attempt to signal to companies that the risk (if not 
the time and expense) of the additional FDA-approval requirements is minimal. 
But the FDA can do more. One option would be to employ a system of 
manufacturer process certification or even precertification, rather than 
certifying the process used for each product. Although the idea of manufacturer 
certification for safety and efficacy (as raised in the context of genetic tests) is 
a new idea to the digital health context, several questions about manufacturing 
processes are assessed at the facility level already.244 Enabling companies to 
lower their per-product regulatory costs by spreading the review over the 
facility might provide a sufficient incentive for companies to do so. 
 
240. See, e.g., Rachel E. Sherman et al., Real-World Evidence - What Is It and What Can it 
Tell Us?, 375 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2293 (2016); see also FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 239, at 13. 
241. 21st Century Cures Act § 3016, 130 Stat. at 1095 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 399h). 
242. See, e.g., Scott Gottlieb, FDA Budget Matters: Investing in Advanced Domestic 
Manufacturing, FDA VOICE (July 13, 2018), https://blogs.fda.gov/fdavoice/index.php/2018/07/fda-
budget-matters-investing-in-advanced-domestic-manufacturing [https://perma.cc/S82N-55KJ]; Michael 
Kopcha, “Continuous Manufacturing” - Common Guiding Principles Can Help Ensure Progress, FDA 
VOICE (Sept. 11, 2017), https://blogs.fda.gov/fdavoice/index.php/2017/09/continuous-manufacturing-
common-guiding-principles-can-help-ensure-progress [https://perma.cc/5JFT-HH6D]. 
243. See Kopcha, supra note 242 (praising Vertex and Janssen for their efforts in this area). 
244. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 211.42-.58 (2019) (Buildings and Facilities). 
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C. Steering Innovation Through Reimbursement Policy 
  CMS’ power to direct research and development resources has been 
shown empirically in a number of studies: when CMS decides to cover a new 
product or set of products, pharmaceutical companies react accordingly and 
invest more in those fields.245 Using the taxonomy developed in Section III.A, I 
identify ways that CMS might use its existing legal authority or might be given 
new authority to steer innovation in a way that encourages improvement in 
intermediate technologies over time. In essence, I argue that we should pay 
more for technologies that work better or have greater health impacts—and we 
should pay less (or not at all) for technologies that do not work as well. 
1. Improvement of Existing Technologies 
In the context of LDTs or other algorithmic technologies, the goal is to 
encourage companies to invest in the continuous improvement of their 
products. Although it is certainly important to consider the regulatory barriers 
currently discouraging such improvements, as I have done in Section III.A 
above, it is also important to ensure that companies are being rewarded 
appropriately for their progress—and perhaps punished for their recalcitrance. 
A version of outcomes-based pricing that builds in principles of reimbursement 
based on cost-effectiveness may prove useful for striking this balance. 
 
245. Medicare Part D is one commonly cited example in the health-insurance context. 
Although the broader Medicare program was created in 1965, Medicare did not have a pharmacy-benefit 
component until 2006, when Medicare Part D went into effect. Medicare Prescription Drug, 
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 1860D-1(2), 117 Stat. 2066, 
2072 (codified in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.). For enrollees who did not previously have 
access to prescription-drug coverage, Part D provided that benefit. Prescription Drug Trends, KAISER 
FAMILY FOUND. 5 (May 2010), https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/3057-
08.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Q29-ZP6K] (“[A]bout one-quarter (27%) of seniors age 65 and older, and 
one-third of poor (34%) and near-poor (33%) seniors, had no drug coverage in 2003.”). For seniors who 
had been able to access prescription drugs through Medicaid or other programs, Part D increased the 
prices pharmaceutical companies could expect for those drugs. Richard G. Frank & Joseph P. 
Newhouse, Should Drug Prices Be Negotiated Under Part D of Medicare? And If so, How?, 27 HEALTH 
AFF. 33, 34, 36-37 (2008). As a result, studies have shown that Part D is associated with increased 
investment in drug classes with higher market share among the Medicare population. Margaret E. 
Blume-Kohout & Neeraj Sood, Market Size and Innovation: Effects of Medicare Part D on 
Pharmaceutical Research and Development, 97 J. PUB. ECON. 327, 327 (2013); see also David Dranove 
et al., Pharmaceutical Profits and the Social Value of Innovation 2-3, 6-7 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 20212, 2014) (qualifying the findings of Blume-Kohout and Sood by 
noting that truly innovative activity takes longer to emerge). Other scholars have found similar results 
by studying individual-coverage mandates or population shifts. See, e.g., Daron Acemoglu & Joshua 
Linn, Market Size in Innovation: Theory and Evidence from the Pharmaceutical Industry, 119 Q.J. 
ECON. 1049, 1084 (2004) (“[A] 1 percent increase in the potential market size for a drug category leads 
to approximately a 4 percent growth in the entry of new nongeneric drugs and new molecular entities.”); 
Amy Finkelstein, Static and Dynamic Effects of Health Policy: Evidence from the Vaccine Industry, 119 
Q.J. ECON. 527, 556-57 (2004) (finding that policies designed to increase the uptake of vaccines, 
including Medicare’s 1993 decision to cover the flu vaccine, resulted in an increase in clinical trials for 
new vaccines). 
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An outcomes-based pricing system recognizes that health care 
technologies will not work for all patients and provides for a system of 
repayment if a drug or device fails to work for a particular patient.246 This 
system can be implemented as a money-back rebate (a drug manufacturer 
might sell a drug for a particular price but owe some or all of that money back 
if the drug fails to work for its intended purpose) or as a bonus payment for 
meeting particular health-related milestones.247 Pharmaceutical companies and 
health insurers have expressed interest in outcomes-based pricing systems, and 
although there are some regulatory obstacles to the practice, several outcomes-
based deals between pharmaceutical companies and insurers have been 
publicly reported.248 
However, it is important for outcomes-based systems to be supported by 
an underlying framework of cost-effectiveness or value-based reimbursement. 
Outcomes-based systems ask whether a product works for its intended purpose. 
They do not ask how well a product works; therefore it is possible for 
pharmaceutical companies to set outcomes-based prices that are still out of 
proportion to the health benefits provided by a product. Cost-effectiveness or 
value-based pricing, on the other hand, does incorporate these metrics of 
value249 and can therefore allow a system to pay more for technologies that 
work better. In other words, cost-effectiveness pricing can enable a system to 
pay more for improved versions of existing technologies. 
Although cost-effectiveness tools have been adopted by governmental 
insurers in other countries in their process for reimbursing new health care 
technologies,250 they have not yet been adopted by governmental insurers in the 
United States.251 Adopting these tools would encourage health care technology 
companies to improve existing technologies by enabling insurers to pay more 
for technologies that provide superior outcomes or health information. A 
woman who receives a VUS result from Myriad arguably should not be made 
to pay the same amount for the test as a woman who receives a clinically 
valuable result.252 Relatedly, explicitly paying more for tests that return more 
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248. Id. at 10-11. 
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250. See, e.g., Technology Appraisal Guidance, NAT’L INST. FOR HEALTH & CARE 
EXCELLENCE, https://www.nice.org.uk/About/What-we-do/Our-Programmes/NICE-guidance/NICE-
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17, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180913.862850/full 
[https://perma.cc/FL5D-BF7S]. 
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valuable information, on average, would encourage improvements in 
algorithmic technologies both in the LDT context and more broadly. 
One strategy for implementing these ideas would be to repurpose the CED 
system discussed supra in Section II.D. As Eisenberg and Varmus note, one 
problem for many of these diagnostic tests at an early stage of development is 
that “[s]ubstantially more data are needed to evaluate clinical utility of such 
testing so that insurers can make rational decisions about coverage, but data 
collection on a large enough scale is impeded, in part, by uncertain 
reimbursement policies.”253 CED allows patients to access the technology 
today, perhaps providing its manufacturer with a reduced level of 
reimbursement, and enables the collection of the information needed for the 
technology’s improvement tomorrow. 
2. Expansion of Existing Technologies 
Technologies that fit the model of the microbiome, where the inquiry in 
question is about the expansion of existing technological platforms, might seek 
to use a different model of innovative reimbursement: indication-based pricing. 
Indication-based pricing recognizes that new health care technologies are often 
used for different purposes. Some may be closely related to each other (as in 
the use of a cancer drug on tumors in different organs), while some may be far 
more distinct (as in the use of Colcrys to treat both gout and familial 
Mediterranean fever).254 When the same drug is used to treat different diseases, 
it may have different health values to patients. That is, the drug may be far 
more effective in treating one condition than another, such that (again 
incorporating principles of cost-effectiveness in reimbursement) insurers and 
pharmaceutical firms would want to be able to price the drug differently for 
different conditions.255 
Similarly to outcomes-based pricing, indication-based pricing that 
accounts for the cost-effectiveness of the technology for the particular disease 
in question would provide incentives for companies to develop and approve 
new indications for existing technologies. At present, the evidence shows that 
fecal transplants are highly effective for the treatment of recurrent C. difficile 
infections,256 but the evidence is far more equivocal for its use in the treatment 
of other conditions, including ulcerative colitis or Crohn’s disease. However, 
we do know that fecal transplants are being administered—albeit often in a do-
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it-yourself context—for conditions like these.257 If companies cannot be 
assured of reimbursement for a particular product unless the evidence 
supporting its use for the prescribed indication is strong, they may be more 
likely to invest in the development of such evidence and expand the relevant 
uses for the existing technology. 
Although at least one private pharmacy benefit manager has begun to use 
indication-based pricing,258 there has been little interest in the practice from 
governmental insurers. This disinterest is likely driven in large part by the same 
factors leading to the disinterest in outcomes-based pricing and cost-
effectiveness analyses more generally. But it is also driven by more mundane 
factors, such as electronic health records. If insurers cannot discern which 
indication a drug is being prescribed for, they cannot assign differential 
payment amounts for the product.259 The development of infrastructure which 
allows for tracking not only of prescriptions but also of indications may 
provide additional incentives for companies to expand their technologies in this 
way. 
3. Process Improvements into Existing Technologies 
In the pharmaceutical-manufacturing context, CMS might repurpose 
another lever it already possesses to drive improvements: the NTAP system, as 
discussed supra in Section II.D. The idea underlying the NTAP program could 
be repurposed to provide additional incentives for pharmaceutical companies to 
invest in manufacturing improvements. Upon receiving FDA approval for those 
improvements, companies might apply for and obtain a time-limited 
reimbursement bonus through Medicare and Medicaid. The NTAP program 
would in this case function much like a prize,260 providing companies with the 
ability to recoup their investment into the improvements while also 
constraining the scope of that bonus payment. This promised incentive has the 
potential to encourage many companies to invest in new manufacturing 
technologies and make the switch on the front end. 
Unfortunately, the NTAP program as it currently exists today could not 
easily be used for this purpose. The program’s statutory scope—the hospital-
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based portions of Medicare261—is too narrow to take account of the full scope 
of pharmaceutical technologies for which it might be advantageous to use the 
program. And NTAP’s current requirement of inadequate reimbursement is 
unlikely to be met in these manufacturing improvement cases.262 But the basic 
structure of the program, its focus on new technologies, and  CMS’ experience 
administering the program lend itself to possible congressional expansion. As 
Congress has already proved willing to appropriate grant funding for further 
research into new manufacturing technologies, encouraging them to extend the 
NTAP program to account for these technological improvements may be 
possible as well. 
IV. Generalizing Beyond Health Technologies 
 As noted in the Introduction, intermediate technologies are not limited 
to the health care context. This Part broadens the scope of the Article, 
considering whether the examples and ideas articulated in Parts II and III are 
generalizable to intermediate technologies in other sectors. In short, it argues 
that at least some technologies embedded within an existing regulatory 
framework (such as self-driving cars) may be susceptible to the same types of 
ossification- or stagnation-related concerns that exist in the health care context. 
However, for technologies that are not currently subject to meaningful 
regulation, even those that will improve and iterate over time, the “intermediate 
technologies” framing as presented in this Article is a poor fit for the kinds of 
challenges they face. 
A. Technologies Already Within an Existing Regulatory Framework 
 One technological area that bears similarities to the health care-
technology context is self-driving or autonomous vehicles, which has been 
considered in a series of articles by Professor Tracy Pearl.263 At present, most 
cars possess at least some basic autonomous features (such as cruise control), 
but increasingly many cars possess features that provide them with greater 
autonomy. A number of car manufacturers offer models with “Active Park 
Assist,” which can help steer as drivers seek to parallel park.264 Many 
manufacturers offer models that assist drivers in staying within their lane, 
 
261. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(K) (2018), establishing the NTAP program, is contained 
within the section of the statute considering “Payment to Hospitals for Inpatient Hospital Services” and 
explicitly contemplates payment methodologies that are unique to that program. See id. 
§ 1395ww(d)(5)(K)(ii)(I) (considering the diagnosis-related group (DRG) prospective payment rate). 
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Greater Regulation of Semi-Autonomous Cars, 93 IND. L.J. 713 (2018). 
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sometimes simply by notifying the driver that they have crossed over a line, but 
in more advanced cases by physically correcting the vehicle’s path.265 Tesla’s 
“Autopilot” feature goes a step further, not only helping cars park and stay 
within their lane, but also instructing the car to actually brake when 
appropriate.266 The goal, though, is full automation. Full automation (provided 
that consumers purchase these vehicles) could save tens of thousands of lives 
each year, reduce traffic accidents, lower insurance premiums,267 and provide 
increased autonomy to older or disabled people.268 
 Self-driving cars therefore present a clear example of an intermediate 
technology in the sense that, although basic versions of some autonomous 
features are available to consumers today, the field has a vision for the future 
and where it hopes to go. The clear progression of autonomous features has 
allowed SAE International, a global professional association for engineers, to 
establish a taxonomy of six levels of automation, from Level 0 (no automation) 
to Level 5 (full automation).269 This taxonomy has been adopted by the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), the federal agency 
with regulatory jurisdiction over cars and motor-vehicle safety.270 
Many of the features described above, such as lane assist and autopilot, 
are features of Level 2 (partial automation) cars, in which there is “automation 
of at least two primary control functions,” but in which the driver “is still 
responsible for monitoring the roadway . . . and is expected to be available for 
control at all times.”271 NHTSA draws a regulatory line between Level 2 and 
Level 3 (conditional automation), in which the “major distinction” is that “the 
vehicle is designed so that the driver is not expected to constantly monitor the 
roadway while driving.”272 In other words, a Level 3 car’s features allow the 
driver to relinquish control to the vehicle under certain situations, regaining it 
only as necessary. The norm is vehicular control, while the norm under Level 2 
is human control. 
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 Autonomous vehicles are subject to a regulatory regime that may create 
some of the ossification-related concerns laid out in the health care context. 
Manufacturers must certify that their vehicles comply with detailed Federal 
Motor Vehicle Safety Standards,273 and autonomous-vehicle manufacturers 
selling unsafe products would be subject to NHTSA’s recall and enforcement 
authority.274 NHTSA has also sought to distinguish vehicles from Levels 0 
through 2 and vehicles from 3 through 5, given the shift in primary control 
from the human driver to the vehicle at that point. A guidance issued under the 
Obama administration envisioned a system in which manufacturers of cars 
Level 3 and above would need to submit mandatory Safety Assessments to the 
agency before marketing or even testing their new vehicles.275 Taken together, 
these regulatory features resemble the types of potentially ossifying (yet well-
meaning and material) regulations that appear in the health care context. If 
manufacturers of Level 3 vehicles would face significantly higher regulatory 
burdens than manufacturers of Level 2 vehicles, some may choose not to move 
forward under those circumstances. 
However, there are at least two key differences between the autonomous 
vehicle context and the health care technologies context that may mitigate 
some of these concerns. First, NHTSA does not currently exercise any 
premarket approval authority over autonomous vehicles.276 This allows 
companies to come to market earlier and mitigates some of the initial risk 
associated with the FDA approval process. Second and relatedly, the 
deregulatory focus of the Trump administration has impacted this area, with 
more recent statements from the administration emphasizing the currently 
voluntary nature of the mandatory safety assessments envisioned by the Obama 
administration.277 A deregulatory FDA, on the other hand, mitigates (as 
through the precertification pilot) but does not eliminate premarket regulation 
of these technologies. 
 The autonomous-vehicle context in some ways resembles the Myriad 
example, in which vehicle manufacturers are seeking to improve existing 
technologies, and in some ways resembles the microbiome example, in which 
vehicle manufacturers are seeking to expand existing technologies. The change 
from a system in which your car notifies you that you are crossing lanes to a 
system in which it corrects that change may be more like the former. Other 
features may be more like the latter. In either case, the challenge is to adapt the 
regulatory framework that best balances innovation and safety. 
Safety issues are particularly paramount in the autonomous-vehicle 
context, even more so than in the health care technologies context, because 
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autonomous vehicles may jeopardize the safety of third parties.278 In the FDA 
context, we may worry that patients will not understand that precertification 
does not produce the “gold standard” of evidence that the FDA has previously 
been known for and has touted.279 But patients may be educated on this topic. 
However, mobile health apps are highly unlikely to jeopardize the safety of 
third parties. Professor Pearl argues that it will be difficult (though necessary) 
to educate drivers of semi-autonomous vehicles about the limits of their cars’ 
capabilities,280 but it is in some sense not even possible to educate third parties, 
who have not consented to the risks at issue. These third-party effects likely 
weigh in favor of more stringent NHTSA regulation for intermediate stages of 
autonomy, even where innovation might proceed more slowly as a result. 
B. Technologies Lacking an Existing Regulatory Framework 
 There are certainly many other technological areas that are subject to 
constant iteration, where improvement over time is an explicit goal. But 
because these technologies are not subject to meaningful governmental 
regulation, the ossification-related concerns of the intermediate technologies 
identified above, in the health care context or otherwise, are not present. The 
oft-repeated Silicon Valley motto “move fast and break things”281 comes to 
mind as an example here. Pharmaceutical companies needing FDA approval 
cannot, by definition, “move fast and break things,” and the autonomous-
vehicle firm who did would face extreme liability from both consumers and 
NHTSA. But Facebook, Google, and other tech companies can and have 
operated with relative immunity from regulation, even as they cause harms 
both large and small.282 
 To be sure, these companies have faced threats of regulation,283 
typically on topics including transparency and consent, data privacy, and 
related consumer protection issues.284 Several technology companies have 
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argued that these threats of future regulation will stifle innovation and harm 
consumer choice.285 This argument strains credulity when applied to certain 
proposals. For instance, the Honest Ads bill would “requir[e] those who 
purchase and publish [online political advertisements] to disclose information 
about the advertisements to the public.”286 It is not clear how requiring 
increased advertising transparency would prevent Facebook or other platforms 
from innovating. Indeed, Facebook has more recently implemented some of the 
bill’s proposals,287 perhaps in an attempt to forestall the passage of the 
remainder. 
 More concerning to companies like these are regulations around their 
use of data. Some data-privacy measures may, at heart, be transparency 
initiatives (as in the case of several provisions of the European Union’s new 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)),288 but others aim for more 
substantive regulation with more severe penalties if violations or harms can be 
shown. Given that, at present, companies like Facebook seem to be unable or 
unwilling to prevent contractors from violating its existing stated policies (as in 
the Cambridge Analytica situation),289 establishing harsher penalties for such 
violations may simply encourage companies to enforce their own rules more 
fully.  
 In general, though, the regulatory systems being proposed (seriously or 
not) for the tech giants are largely being conceived of as ex post remedies for 
violating more general consumer or data-privacy protections. These are 
fundamentally different from the overlapping regulatory structures we observe 
in the health care context, where preapproval of new products or of changes to 
existing products combines with governmental reimbursement and intellectual 
property systems to create conflicting incentives for companies. Even in the 
autonomous-vehicle context, which at present lacks a preapproval mechanism, 
the regulators in question are applying different levels of regulation to different 
levels of autonomy in a way that may bias innovation (appropriately or not). At 
present, there are no such barriers for tech firms. 
 The foregoing analysis suggests some general principles administrative 
agencies might choose to follow when considering whether the problem of 
intermediate technologies is relevant within their jurisdictional area. First, 
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agency leaders may identify technologies facing ossification concerns of the 
type articulated in this Article, part of which involves considering whether a 
technology sits within an existing regulatory framework or not. Second, in the 
process of identifying such technologies, regulators ought to identify barriers to 
their development on both the front and back end. Third and finally, regulators 
might articulate potential push and pull solutions to address those barriers. 
 These general solutions are likely to differ strongly by area of 
technology. Although several other technological areas may have a front-end 
regulator performing an FDA-like approval function, few if any other areas 
have an entity that replicates  CMS’ function, in which the government is also a 
primary purchaser of particular technologies. In those cases, other pull 
mechanisms like prizes or tax subsidies to lower prices for consumers may 
assume greater prominence. 
V. Conclusion 
 Although scholars and policymakers are continuing to prioritize efforts 
to encourage companies in many different technological sectors to innovate, 
they have largely ignored the ways in which existing regulatory structures bear 
on technological development from a temporal perspective. This Article’s 
recognition and description of the problem of intermediate technologies may 
assist scholars, agencies, and policymakers in advancing more flexible 
regulatory frameworks that reward companies for continued innovation and 
improvement, not only innovation in the first instance. 
 
